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Current asset management practices of municipal infrastructure focus on modeling water, sewer 
and road networks into isolated layers and hence overlook the spatial and functional 
interdependencies among these assets. For instance, the performance of an asset can be impacted 
spatially and/or functionally by its neighboring assets. Vulnerability assessment, in this study, 
measures the asset’s degree of susceptibility for structural and/or functional failures triggered by 
failure of these functions in neighboring assets. The objective of this research is to develop a 
computational framework for optimizing intervention policies for likely vulnerable civil 
infrastructure networks considering spatial and functional interdependencies. The developed 
framework integrates three models; 1) interdependency assessment model, 2) vulnerability 
assessment model and 3) system dynamics model. 
The interdependency assessment model captures spatially and functionally interdependent assets 
utilizing two developed modules: spatial interdependency module and functional interdependency 
module. The spatial module utilizes ArcGIS geoprocessing tools in determining geographically 
interdependent assets. It encapsulates interdependent assets in a set of new layers and a newly 
developed database containing characteristics of such interdependencies. On the other hand, the 
functional module employs graph theory principles in determining an asset's degree of 
connectivity with its neighboring assets. The functional module will aid in recognizing the likely 
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influence of an asset failure on its neighboring assets' performance using betweenness centrality. 
The output of the assessment model is in the form of bundles of spatially and functionally 
interdependent assets.   
For vulnerability assessment, three computational models are developed and experimented with to 
rate vulnerability of civil infrastructure systems considering their spatial and functional 
interdependencies with neighboring assets. These models are; 1) multi-attribute utility theory 
(MAUT), 2) artificial neural network (ANN) and 3) fuzzy c-mean clustering (FCM). Operation 
and maintenance reports obtained from two Canadian municipalities (the Cities of London and 
Hamilton, Ontario) were used to select factors influencing the vulnerability of water, sewer and 
road assets. For the MAUT model and based on the identified factors from operation and 
maintenance reports, surveys were sent to 65 experts and their feedback was elicited to construct 
utility functions to rate the degree of vulnerability of interdependent assets. The response rate of 
the survey was 75%. On the other hand, the ANN model utilizes self-organized mapping algorithm 
(SOM) to rate vulnerability of these assets based on recognized patterns in each dataset. The ANN 
model is a data driven model requiring sufficient amount of observed patterns and extensive effort 
in modeling with less involvement from experts. On the other hand, the FCM model is capable of 
accounting for ambiguity and imprecision associated with experts’ input in rating vulnerability of 
interdependent assets.   
Subsequently, the system dynamics (SD) model is developed to help identify possible least cost 
intervention policies for interdependent infrastructure assets that meet customers' expectations and 
decrease assets’ vulnerability. The developed SD model consists of 23 variables and 8 causal 
feedback loops. These causal loops are developed based on the reviewed literature and four 
unstructured interviews with three experts in the domain of municipal asset management; one from 
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the City of London and two from the City of Hamilton. The SD is augmented with two optimization 
algorithms to find optimal intervention policies at bundle and network levels; 1) dynamic 
programing algorithm, 2) single objective genetic algorithm.  
Two case studies were analyzed and presented to demonstrate the application of the proposed 
framework and its expected contributions using data obtained from the Cities of London and 
Hamilton, Ontario. The interdependency model constructed 10,500 bundles for the City of London 
and 12,350 bundles for the City of Hamilton. For the vulnerability model, the developed FCM 
model showed better performance than ANN in mimicking experts’ judgement. The mean square 
error (MSE) for the FCM model was 42% less than that of the ANN model. Also, there was a 
linear correlation between the number of breaks for water assets and their vulnerability ratings 
(R2=0.79). When the SD model was supplemented by the modified genetic algorithm, the 
computational time for finding near optimal solutions at network level was decreased by 50% for 
the City of London and by 47.2 % for the City of Hamilton when compared to traditional genetic 
algorithm.  
The results of the developed vulnerability and SD models were shared with the experts. The 
developed vulnerability models will be useful for staff to justify increases to intervention budget 
to each City Council. In spite of the relatively complicated nature of ANN and FCM models, the 
experts were relatively comfortable using these models. However, the experts commented that this 
might not be the case with other municipalities that are still starting their asset management 
programs. For the SD model, the experts agreed that the model is beneficial for identifying possible 
least cost intervention policies at bundle and network level. They however pointed out that the SD 
model can be enhanced by accounting for factors related to social and economic characteristics of 
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their customers. The modified genetic algorithm can be enhanced more by the deployment of 
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Chapter 1 : INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General  
Infrastructure asset management aims to maintain the public capital intensive 
assets in a condition that meets community preferences and decreases likelihood for 
catastrophic failures. The 2013 infrastructure report card of (American Society of Civil 
Engineering) ASCE rated the condition of water, sewer and road infrastructure networks 
in the United States as D; indicating that these infrastructure networks are in poor 
condition and mostly below standard, with many assets approaching the end of their 
service life. The report also stressed that a large number of these assets exhibits 
significant deterioration with enormous concern over their future condition and capacity. 
Catastrophic failures of asset management are mainly due to deterioration in physical 
resilience of assets with time. Therefore, the performance and operation modeling of 
these systems have been developed to support planning, maintenance, and retrofit 
decision making from multiple view points, including infrastructure owners or investors, 
private and public users, and government entities.  
Generally, the models described in the literature focus on isolated analysis of 
infrastructure assets for a specific domain (i.e. water, sewer, roadways…etc.); ignoring 
spatial and functional interdependencies. For instance, this approach seems to be 
inappropriate as the function of road asset may be affected by failure of a nearby water 
asset. This depicts spatial vulnerability. Also, the propagations of such failure on other 
parts of the water network can be disastrous depending on the number of customers that 
will be affected and the category of these customers. This depicts functional 
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vulnerability. In July 2014, a water pipeline break flooded the Sunset Boulevard of 
California and parts of UCLA campus, discharging 8 to 10 million gallons of water; 
resulting in catastrophic social and economic consequences (Yan and Almasy, 2014). 
This water pipeline breakage generated a power failure, disruption to functionalities of 
nearby water, sewer and road assets and resulted in diminishing power and water 
recourses needed for firefighting (Yan and Almasy, 2014).  In California, an electric 
power disruptions in early 2001 affected oil and natural gas production, refinery 
operations, pipeline transport of gasoline and jet fuel within California and to its 
neighboring states, and the movement of water from northern to central and southern 
regions of the state for crop irrigation (Rinaldi et al., 2001). The cascading effects to this 
catastrophe has idled key industries which led to billions of dollars of lost productivity, 
and stressed the entire Western power grid, causing far-reaching security and reliability 
concerns. Additionally, the ice storm in January 1998 in Quebec caused a huge power 
failure, disruption of water supply and sanitation systems, traffic chaos and resulted in 
diminishing power and water recourses needed for firefighting (Moselhi et al., 2005). 
Such catastrophic events and others necessitated the study of infrastructure 
interdependency, vulnerability assessment and mitigation action modeling of critical 
infrastructure systems (Crucittia et al., 2003; Gesara and Osorio, 2010; Roshani and 
Filion, 2014; Wu et al., 2014; Laucelli and Giustolisi, 2014). 
1.2  Interdependency and Vulnerability Assessment 
Infrastructure systems interdependency is a rapidly growing area of study with 
contributions from multiple researchers in various engineering, mathematical and social 
science disciplines (Rinaldi et al., 2001). It primarily focuses on aiding decision makers 
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to achieve national security, economic prosperity, and quality of life (Gesara et al., 
2010).  Such economic and social prosperity is attained while heavily depending on the 
continuous and reliable operation of critical interdependent infrastructure systems. The 
study of interdependent infrastructure systems is challenging due to heterogeneous 
characteristics of infrastructure systems, insufficient data and the need to account for 
their spatial and functional aspects and its effect on supply-demand operation (Gesara et 
al., 2010). Researchers have attempted to model various types of interdependencies; (i.e. 
spatial, functional, social, economic….etc.) as will be discussed in Chapter 2. In this 
research, only spatial and functional interdependencies are considered. In this study, 
spatial interdependency addresses whether an infrastructure’s structural integrity or 
performance is threatened by being located in the same geospatial area of neighboring 
assets (Rinaldi et al., 2001, Tushith and Moselhi, 2010). Also, Functional 
interdependency assesses to which degree the performance of infrastructure is impacted 
by the structural integrity or performance of a neighboring asset (Rinaldi et al., 2001, 
Dudenhoeffer et al., 2006). 
On the other hand, vulnerability, in this research, is defined as the degree of 
susceptibility to structural or functional failures as a result of being interdependent with 
neighboring assets (Atef and Moselhi, 2014). Hence, there are two types of 
vulnerabilities: 1) spatial vulnerability and 2) functional vulnerability. Vulnerability 
assessment is the process of identifying systems’ weaknesses due to specific events and 




As will be shown in the literature review chapter, modeling of spatial and 
functional interdependencies and their impact on vulnerability of civil infrastructure 
networks is not considered in current asset management practices (Orabi and El-Rayes, 
2012; Roshani and Filion, 2014; Mandapaka et al., 2012). Previous decision support 
systems (DSS) were designed and implemented ignoring the underlying spatial and 
functional interdependencies that exist between water, sewer and road networks 
(Moselhi et al, 2005).  Also, studies on vulnerability and interdependency modeling 
focused primarily on disaster management applications ( Ezell, 2005; Karmakar et al., 
2010; Eun et al, 2010; Ouyang et al., 2009; Osorio et al., 2007). 
1.3 Problem Statement  
The main limitations with respect to this research in current state of the art of 
asset management of municipal infrastructure can be stated as: 
1- Previous DSS for rehabilitation and maintenance policies were primarily 
implemented ignoring underlying spatial and functional interdependencies that 
exist between water, sewer and road networks. 
2- For interdependency models, current models were oriented towards assessing 
functional and/or economic interdependencies between various interacted 
networks for disaster management (Santos & Haimes, 2004; Osorio et al., 2010; 
Karmakaret al., 2010; Roshani and Filion, 2014). In asset management, decision 
makers maintain public capital intensive assets to meets customers’ expectations 
not only to avoid catastrophic failures.  
3- For vulnerability models, current state of the art focuses on studying 
independently factors affecting vulnerability due to spatial interdependency and 
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function interdependency (Roshani and Filion, 2014; Mandapaka et al., 2012; 
Wei et al, 2009). 
4- For interdependency and vulnerability models: 
i.  Previous studies fail to objectively allocate the diminished resources for 
intervention policies on network levels (Ezell, 2005; Ouyang et al., 2009; 
Osorio et al., 2010). 
ii. Previous studies did not consider operation and maintenance reports of 
civil infrastructure networks in understanding causes for increasing or 
decreasing vulnerability of interdependent assets (Ezell, 2005; Karmakar 
et al., 2010; Flax et al., 2003; Wu et al., 2014; Laucelli and Giustolisi, 
2014).  
iii. Previous studies considered primarily hypothetical examples or small 
size networks and did not test the stability and suitability to real large 
scale networks (Santos & Haimes, 2004; Stapelberg, 2011; Wu et al., 
2014; Laucelli and Giustolisi, 2014).      
1.4 Objectives and Motivation 
The paradigm in asset management now is shifting from targeting a responsive 
policy to proactive policy with focus on integrated infrastructure management (Tushith 
and Moselhi, 2012; Osman et al., 2012). As mentioned early, most interdependencies 
models and vulnerability models were introduced primarily to cope with the disaster 
management. Therefore, the main objective of this research is to present a computational 
framework for optimizing intervention policies for integrated civil infrastructure 
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networks considering spatial and functional interdependencies. This can be achieved by 
a number of sub-objectives: 
1- Study how infrastructure spatial and functional interdependencies can be 
modeled and incorporated into the framework of asset management. Capturing 
spatial and functional interdependent assets (bundles) is important for directing 
the analysis towards the most vulnerable parts of the infrastructure networks that 
can rapidly affect the functionality of other neighboring infrastructure systems. 
2- Understand the effect of interdependency on the vulnerability assessment by 
recognizing various factors that control the rating of assets’ vulnerability. 
Operation and maintenance reports were not utilized by other researchers in asset 
management to understand how assets become susceptible to failures based on 
their interdependencies. 
3- Explore various computational models that can be incorporated for modeling 
vulnerability of interdependent assets. As highlighted in the problem statement, 
data availability was a major challenge to other researchers. This research will 
explore three models to handle limitations identified in previous vulnerability 
models such as 1) reliable historical data availability, 2) experts availability, and 
3) ambiguity in collected judgments of experts.    
4- Develop an automated DSS to optimize intervention policies at bundle and 
network levels in an effort to decrease vulnerability of water, sewer and road 
systems and cope with budget constraints. Intervention policies are selected to 
maximize the overall satisfaction of decision makers, considering interdependent 
assets’ condition, vulnerability and level of service (LOS).  
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1.5 Research Framework Overview 
The proposed research framework consists of three computational models as 
shown in Figure 1-1 and described below: 
1- Literature review: the literature review focused on four topics: 1) 
interdependency assessment, 2) vulnerability assessment, 3) simulation models 
and 4) optimization and learning algorithms. This comprehensive literature 
review was used to; 1) identify current research gaps, 2) identify factors and 
models utilized by other researchers to assess vulnerability of interdependent 
assets and 3) select the most suitable research methods for achieving the above 
stated objective.  
2- Data Collection:  Two data sets of water, sewer and road infrastructure networks 
obtained from City of London, Ontario and City of Hamilton were analyzed. 
These datasets were analyzed not only to understand current practices of asset 
management but also to structure and develop the proposed models. The 
operation and maintenance reports were examined to extract factors influencing 
vulnerability of interdependent assets. The identified factors from the operation 
and maintenance reports of the two datasets are added to the identified factors 
from the literature and utilized as an input for the vulnerability model.  
3- Interdependency assessment model: This model captures spatially and 
functionally interdependent assets using two modules: 1) spatial module, and 2) 
functional module. The spatial module utilizes ArcGIS geoprocessing tools in 
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The spatial module encapsulates the interdependent assets in a set of new layers 
and a new generated database containing characteristics of such 
interdependencies. On the other hand, the functional module employs principles 
of graph theory in determining an asset's degree of connectivity with its 
neighboring assets. The functional module will aid in recognizing the likely 
influence of an asset failure on its neighboring assets' performance. 
4- Vulnerability assessment model: three computational models are investigated to 
assess vulnerability of interdependent assets; 1) Multi attribute utility theory 
(MAUT), 2) Artificial neural networks (ANN) and 3) Fuzzy c-mean (FCM). 
While Ezell (2005) used MAUT to rate vulnerability of water assets, Ezell 
(2005) ignored interdependencies effect on vulnerability assessment. Also, the 
performance of the MAUT model against other artificial intelligence models 
such as ANN and FCM was not benchmarked. The MAUT model utilizes 
judgments elicited from experts to construct utility functions for rating 
vulnerability of interdependent assets. However, the MAUT model suffers from 
the following; 1) experts don’t necessarily understand or capture all observed 
patterns that can be found in each dataset, 2) subjectivity in estimating weights 
of selected MAUT factors and 3) ambiguity in rating vulnerability of 
interdependent assets due to collected judgements of experts. The ANN model 
is a data driven technique requiring less involvement from experts and is capable 
of capturing all observed patterns that can be found in each dataset. On the other 
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hand, the FCM model considers ambiguity that exists in rating vulnerability of 
interdependent assets due to collected experts’ judgement. 
5- System dynamics model: SD aids in understanding the behavior of complex 
systems at strategic level over time through causal feedback loops and stocks 
flow (Sterman, 2000). The system dynamics is utilized because; 1) it can 
represent nonlinear and history dependent systems (Osman et al., 2012), 2) 
causal feedback loops can be used to represent complex interactions on a 
strategic level among interdependent systems (Arboleda et al., 2010).  The SD 
model is used to find optimal intervention policies at bundle level and network 
level respectively using two algorithms;  
I. Dynamic programing algorithm: The dynamic programming is an exact 
solution algorithm and is utilized at bundle level for finding and ranking 
the available intervention policies. The objective of this algorithm is to 
maximize the total satisfaction of decision makers gained by applying 
intervention policies at bundle level. The dynamic programming 
algorithm evaluates all the possible intervention policies and ranks the 
top ten policies based on the above stated objective considering 
condition, LOS and vulnerability constraints.  
II. Single objective genetic algorithm: The genetic algorithm is a near 
optimal solution algorithm and is deployed to find a near optimal policy 
at the network level considering the ranked policies identified by the 
dynamic programming algorithm. The single objective genetic algorithm 
(SOGA) is modified by; 1) integrating a query based filtering function 
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into the SOGA to cluster similar bundles, 2) dynamic memory to store 
worst solutions to prevent the regeneration of such solutions in next 
iterations, and 3) modifying the behavior of the mutation function to 
improve the convergence rate of the genetic algorithm. The system 
dynamics model is implemented using C#. 
The general research methodology is shown in Figure 1-1. The details of the 
research framework and its proposed models are discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.  
1.6 Thesis Organization 
The thesis consists of seven chapters and four appendices. The literature review 
is presented in Chapter 2. The review covers the topics of interdependency assessment, 
vulnerability assessment, simulation models, and optimization and learning algorithms. 
The listed topics are reviewed with a focus on how they reflect upon the developed 
models. Summary of the limitations and gaps in existing methods are presented at the 
end of this chapter as well. Chapter 3 begins by presenting an overview of the two 
datasets used to develop and test the proposed research framework. A detailed analysis 
is performed utilizing the operation and maintenance reports of water, sewer and road 
assets. Factors affecting asset’s vulnerability are extracted. Chapter 4 describes the 
developed research framework and its proposed models. Chapter 5 covers the computer 
implementation of the developed research framework. It covers the designed database, 
classes, use-cases, sequence diagram and snapshots from its Graphical User Interface 
(GUI). In Chapter 6, two case studies are analyzed to demonstrate the potential benefits 
of applying the developed research framework. Chapter 7 highlights contributions and 
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Chapter 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Current asset management practices separate infrastructure networks into 
isolated layers ignoring their spatial and functional interdependencies with surrounding 
networks. For instance, consider a bridge with a gas pipeline attached to its deck, any 
failure in that bridge will probably compromise the functionality of parts of the gas 
network and the road network as well. Therefore, interdependency assessment facilitates 
identification of possibly interdependent assets, while vulnerability assessment aids in 
identifying their likely susceptibility to failures based on such interdependencies. The 
study of interdependency and vulnerability assessment was advanced in the last decade 
to provide decision makers with tools for judging systems performance mainly for 
disaster management applications. Terrorist attacks and natural hazards have amplified 
the importance of being equipped with DSS that encapsulate vulnerability assessment 
of infrastructure networks based on their interdependencies with neighbouring networks 
(Khan et al., 2010).  
In current asset management practices, modeling of spatial and functional 
interdependencies and their impact on vulnerability of civil infrastructure networks is 
not considered (Moselhi et al, 2005; Wu et al., 2014).  As will be shown later in this 
chapter, vulnerability and interdependency modeling, primarily, targeted disaster 
management applications (Osorio et al., 2007; Ouyang et al., 2009; Karmakar et al., 
2010; Eun et al, 2010). The majority of the reviewed models and DSS for vulnerability 
assessment were designed and implemented ignoring the underlying spatial and/or 
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functional interdependencies that exist between civil infrastructure networks. Also, there 
is a lack of computational models to optimize intervention polices for interdependent 
infrastructure networks both on the bundle level (two or three interdependent assets) and 























Figure 2-1 Chapter 2 overview 
The literature review starts with discussing interdependency assessment, its 
classifications and models. The interdependency assessment models are classified into: 
1) spatial interdependency models, 2) functional interdependency models and 3) 
economic interdependency models. Vulnerability assessment models are categorized 
into: 1) models overlooking interdependencies and 2) models considering 
interdependencies. The current state of the art of vulnerability assessment models is 
discussed and its limitations are identified as well. Available intervention actions to 
overcome the likely vulnerability of water, sewer and road assets are also covered. 
Subsequently, fuzzy set theory, artificial neural networks and optimization models are 
reviewed comprehensively as research methods that were utilized later in the research 
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framework chapter. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of identified 
limitations in previous research efforts. Figure 2-1 provides an overview of the topics 
covered in this chapter.   
2.2 Infrastructure Interdependency  
As mentioned previously, interdependency assessment facilitates the 
identification of possibly interdependent assets and hence aids in identifying their likely 
susceptibility to failures in neighboring assets. Researchers tried to study and classify 
various types of interdependencies among civil infrastructure networks for applications 
in different contexts such as natural disaster management and response to terrorist 
attacks. The following subsections extract these classifications and illustrate how some 
of these classifications were modeled.   
2.2.1 Interdependency Classifications  
Rinaldi, et al. (2001) classified infrastructure interdependencies as being one of 
four types: physical, cyber, geographic or logical. Physical interdependency means that 
the physical output of one infrastructure is the physical input to another infrastructure. 
Cyber interdependencies occur when infrastructure networks are being connected via 
information links and this type of interdependency is relatively new and is a result of 
advanced computerization and networking. Geographical interdependency means that 
two infrastructure assets impact one another because of geospatial proximity. Events 
like explosion or fire could create correlated disturbances in these geographically 
interdependent infrastructures. Logical interdependency means that the state of one 
infrastructure depends on the state of another infrastructure, usually via human decisions 
and actions. For example, lowering gas price may increase the availability of gasoline 
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in the market, increase cars purchases and cause traffic congestion. In this case, the 
logical interdependency between the petroleum and transportation infrastructure 
networks is due to macro-economic principles and not as result of a physical process.  
A study developed by Dudenhoeffer et al. (2006) used a slightly expanded 
taxonomy where the categorization classifies the following types of relationships into: 
physical, informational, geospatial, policy/procedural and social interdependency. 
Physical and geospatial interdependencies definitions are similar to the definitions 
proposed by Rinalde et al. (2001). Informational interdependency defined as 
informational or control requirements between components. For instance, a loss of the 
SCADA system, supervisory control and data acquisition, will not by itself shut down 
the grid, but the ability to remotely monitor and operate the breakers is lost. Likewise, 
this relationship may represent a piece of information or intelligence flowing from a 
node that supports a decision process elsewhere. On the other hand, policy/procedural 
interdependency is due to policy or procedure that relates the state in one infrastructure 
sector to another infrastructure sector. For example, after the terrorist attacks of 2001 on 
the World Trade Towers, all U.S. air transportations were halted for more than 24 hours, 
and commercial flights were not resumed until three to four days. Social 
interdependency is the influence that an infrastructure component may have on the 
community such as public opinion, public confidence, fear, and cultural issues. Even if 
no physical linkage or relationship exists, consequences from events in one 
infrastructure may impact other infrastructures.  
Earl et al. (2004) classified infrastructure interdependency into five min 
categories:  input, mutual, co-located, shared and exclusive dependency. Input 
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interdependency depicts that the infrastructure requires input of one or more services 
from another infrastructure in order to operate. For example, the reliance of components 
in many infrastructure systems on power generators like pumps for water networks. 
Mutual interdependency means that two or more infrastructure assets are functionally 
interdependent upon each other. An example of mutual interdependency for two 
infrastructures occurs when an output of infrastructure A is an input to infrastructure B, 
and an output of infrastructure B is an input to infrastructure A (Earl et al., 2004). This 
could be a compressor in a natural gas system requiring power to operate and the 
generating facility that generates the power relies on the natural gas for fuel. Co-located 
interdependency definition is similar to the geospatial interdependency definitions 
presented by Rinalde et al. (2001) and Dudenhoeffer et al. (2006) explained earlier. 
Shared interdependency occurs when physical components or activities of an 
infrastructure used in providing two or more services are shared. For example, streets 
are used by the transit system and by emergency services, two services sharing one 
infrastructure component. Exclusive interdependency is basically only one of two or 
more services can be provided by an infrastructure component at a time. An example of 
this can be drawn from the World Trade Center attack when some streets were made 
available only to emergency vehicles; private and transit vehicles were barred from 
using these areas (Earl et al., 2004). 
2.2.2 Interdependency Models    
Generally, infrastructure interdependency modeling can be categorized into 
spatial, functional and economical models. Spatial interdependency models were 
utilized to encapsulate assets that are co-located in the XYZ planes (Tushith and 
18 
 
Moselhi, 2012; Shehata, 2013). Tushith and Moselhi (2012) deployed the geoprocessing 
toolbox of ArcGIS to encapsulate spatially interdependent water, sewer and road assets. 
The authors used the proposed model to quantify the extent of spatial overlap between 
two asset classes in order to determine the most suitable intervention based on the asset 
driving the rehabilitation. However, the authors chose not to address functional 
interdependencies among civil infrastructure assets and didn’t consider their effect along 
with spatial interdependencies on increasing or decreasing assets’ vulnerability. Shehata 
(2013) also utilized geoprocessing toolbox of ArcGIS to encapsulate spatially 
interdependent water, sewer and road assets for risk assessment. Shehata’s (2013) model 
also shared the same limitations of Tushith and Moselhi’s model (2012).  
Functional interdependency models abstract each network functionality using 
graph theory principles and assess its interdependency using parameters such as degree 
of vertices, average shortest path and the clustering coefficient (Crucittia et al., 2003; 
Gesara and Osorio, 2010; Wu et al., 2014). In graph theory models, a network can be 
visualized as finite collection of entities together with a specified pattern of relationships 
among these entities. A generic network is represented by a graph G with N vertices 
(nodes) and K edges (arcs, links or connections) (Crucittia et al., 2003). Such a graph is 
described by the so-called adjacency matrix (A) (also called connection matrix) as 
shown in Figure 2-2. Adjacency matrix (A) is N by N symmetric matrix, whose entry aij 
is 1 if there is an edge joining vertex i to vertex j, and 0 otherwise. An important 
characteristic of graph G is the degree of a generic vertex V, the number of edges K 
incident with vertex Vi or in other words the number of neighbors of i. In the above 
figure, K =∑ 𝐾𝑖/2𝑖  because each link is counted twice, and the average value of ki is 
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<k> =2𝐾/𝑁.  This implies that higher average degree of G implies stronger 
interconnectivity of the nodes in the network.   
Figure 2-2 Network with adjacency matrix (adapted from Crucittia et al., 2003) 
Another property is the characteristic path length (L) of a network which is the 




 …………….………………………………….………………Equation 2-1 
Where 𝐿𝑖,𝑗the shortest distance between any two nodes, N is is the number of nodes in 
the graph.  
As the characteristic path length increases, the network is almost in liner chain 
and as the characteristic path length decreases, the network can be said to be in compact 
form. The third measure is the clustering coefficient C which is the ratio between the 
total number of the edges (𝑒𝑖) actually connecting its nearest neighbors to the i
th node 
and the total number of all possible edges between all these nearest neighbors 
(ki(ki−1)/2) ; if the i




 ………...……………………………………………………Equation 2-2 
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Where ei is the total number of edges actually connecting the i
th node’s nearest 
neighbors, Ki is the vertex degree 





 ………………………………………………………………….Equation 2-3 
Where N is the number of nodes in the graph. 
The above stated functional interdependency models overlooked the effect of 
assets’ condition on functional interdependency and such models were also designed for 
disaster management applications. These models were focusing on capturing 
functionally interdependent assets but did not attempt at allocating intervention actions 
based on the captured interdependencies.   
Economic interdependency models were implemented to assess the effect of 
natural or man-made hazards on interdependent networks by utilizing either input/output 
analysis (IO) (Haimes et al., 2001; Haimes and Jiang, 2001; Santos and Haimes, 2004) 
or simulation techniques (Macal and Macal, 2005; Dudenhoeffer et al., 2006). Input-
Output (IO) economic analysis was introduced by Wassily Leontief in the early 1930s, 
but adapted later to model interdependent infrastructure systems using the same 
principles for interrelated economic sectors interactions.  Any economic system is 
assumed to consist of a group of n interacting sectors or industries and each industry 
produces one product (commodity). A given industry requires labor, input from the 
outside, and also goods from interacting industries. Therefore, each industry must 
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produce enough goods to meet both interacting demands from other industries in the 
group plus external demands (e.g., foreign trade and industries outside the group). A 
static (equilibrium-competitive) economy, with constant coefficients for a fixed unit of 
time (1 year), is assumed (Haimes et al., 2001). Using the early Leontief IO analysis, 
Haimes et al. (2001) developed the linear input-output inoperability model (IIM) to 
study the inoperability of interdependent networks. The developed model employed the 
basic principle shown in Equation 2-4 for economic interdependency between different 
sectors. 
𝑋𝑖 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗. 𝑋𝑗 + 𝐶𝑖  𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∀ 𝑖𝑗 ……………………….……….………….…..Equation 2-4  
Where 𝑋𝑖 : The total production output from the industry, I, 𝑎𝑖𝑗: The Leontief technical 
coefficient, the ratio of inputs of industry i to industry j, in terms of the production 
requirements of industry j and 𝐶𝑖 : The portion of industry i’s final production for end 
user consumption.   
From infrastructure perspective, this equation can be interpreted as risk of 
inoperability. In this model, xj is the overall risk of inoperability experienced by 
infrastructure j, and is a measure of both degree of inoperability and its probability. aij 
is the probability of inoperability that the jth infrastructure contributes to the ith 
infrastructure due to their interdependency, and cj is the additional risk of inoperability 
that is inherent in the complexity of the jth infrastructure.  
For example, in a two system model where failure of subsystem 2 leads 
subsystem 1 to be 80% inoperable, and a failure of system 1 leads subsystem 2 to be 
20% inoperable, the effects of functionality loss due to an external perturbation can be 
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calculated by solving the Leontief equation adapted for infrastructures (Haimes and 
Jiang, 2001). Specifically, interdependent effects can amplify a 60% loss of performance 
from external perturbations in subsystem 2 to a 57% inoperability of subsystem 1, and 

















Figure 2-3 I/O model for two sub-systems (Haimes & Jiang, 2001) 
Santos and Haimes (2004) then created the demand-reduction model to 
complement the economic analysis for interdependent infrastructure systems. This 
demand-reduction model utilized both geographic and functional decomposition 
methods to allow for a more accurate analysis of specific geographic regions and the 
breakdown of large-scale systems into smaller subsystems (Santos & Haimes, 2004).  
The above sited IO  models suffers from the following; 1) the need for extensive data 
mining and experts opinions in order to estimate the required inputs, 2) being designed 
and implemented for disaster management applications and 3) the lack of computational 
models to optimize intervention actions based on the captured degree of economical 
interdependency. 
On the other hand, simulation models aim to simulate infrastructure networks 
through agent based modeling (ABM) or system dynamics (SD) to encapsulate the 
interactions between various networks and users as well with the adoption of graph 
theory principles (Dudenhoeffer et al., 2006). In agent based simulations, infrastructure 
networks are modeled as complex adaptive systems (CAS) composed of agents where 
each agent has a specific set of characteristics. An agent is a singular piece of code with 
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a specific physical location, function, and memory of past interactions and behaviors. A 
fundamental element of CAS and agent based modeling (ABM) is the emergence of 
agents’ behaviors when agents are brought together to interact in a single environment. 
Different agents can be modeled at varying degrees of granularity based on the intended 
level of resolution modeling (Macal & Macal, 2005). Several ABM tools have been 
released recently to encapsulate economic interdependencies among civil infrastructure.  
Researchers at Sandia National Laboratories have developed agent based 
economic laboratory (N-ABLE) for analyzing economic factors’ effect on 
interdependent infrastructure assets (Macal & Macal, 2005). N-ABLE is a simulation 
environment in which a set of agents simulate real-world manufacturing firms, 
government agencies, and households. N-ABLE was developed using C++ to run on a 
single-processor computer. Each agent behaves the way its counterpart in the real world 
would behave, as the simulation traces the agent’s daily actions (e.g., buying 
commodities, selling commodities, paying for commodities by check…etc.). This 
modeling approach is well suited for investigating the behavior of complex, nonlinear 
stochastic systems like the economy. Agents start each time increment making decisions 
much like their real-life counterparts. Decisions on actions to take are based either on 
probabilities computed from actual microeconomic data or on results of learning models 
including genetic algorithms. These decisions include purchasing products, hiring 
workers, selling bonds, collecting welfare payments, conducting open market 
operations, and others. Macroeconomic variables, such as gross domestic product, 
inflation, and the unemployment rate are computed as aggregate results of innumerable 
decisions by the individual economic agents. 
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Another ABM was developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL), CIMS, to 
simulate economic interdependencies among infrastructure assets and the complex 
behaviors that can result. The key characteristic of the agent and the simulations is that 
each agent exists as an individual entity which maintains a state, senses input, and 
possesses rules of behavior that act upon the inputs and either modify the state or 
produce an output (Dudenhoeffer et al., 2006). The infrastructures networks within the 
simulation are modeled using graph theory and visualized using 3D objects. The model 
was introduced as a tool for infrastructure analysis supporting the ability to conduct 
“what if” scenario analysis. According to the authors, CIMS has been applied to evaluate 
infrastructure at the INL and has been used as a validation tool with other infrastructure 
interdependency modeling projects. Currently, CIMS is being evaluated by the 
Louisiana Recovery Authority for applications in Hurricane Katrina and Rita recovery 
and restoration activities (Dudenhoeffer et al., 2006). 
System dynamics (SD) is an approach for understanding the behavior of complex 
systems over time and deploys internal feedback loops and time delays that affect the 
behavior of the entire system (Sterman, 2000). System dynamics is unique from other 
approaches in studying complex systems by considering the effect of feedback loops, 
stocks and flows and describes how even seemingly simple systems display baffling 
nonlinearity. Stapelberg (2011) presented a conceptual system dynamic model that can 




Figure 2-4 General framework for Infrastructure Interdependency using SD (Stapelberg, 
2011) 
Afterwards, the model developed by Stapelberg (2011) is used to encapsulate the 
system reaction due to certain type of hazards. In this model, the author differentiates 
between two concepts; system dependency and system interdependency. The system 
dependency means that system A depends on system B but system B is independent 
from system A. Interdependency means both systems depends on each other.  Feedback 
is deployed to facilitate the visualization of certain physical or functional failure of 
systems elements on other systems. For instance, in water industry, as the demands of 
different sectors increases and users for water usage, the overall usage rate will increases 
as shown in Figure 2-5. As such, the water supply rate should be increased to cope with 
such effect which is controlled by government regulation and policies. The supply can 
be increased by capital investment in constructing new infrastructure elements or 
enhancing the capacity of existing infrastructure. These investments however are 
controlled by the economy and financial capability of the State at time of the analysis. 
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Figure 2-5 SD model using feeding loops for water industry (Stapelberg, 2011) 
The simulation models that were stated above for assessing economic 
interdependency between civil infrastructure networks suffer from the following: 1) the 
majority of these models are either conceptual or still under development and thus such 
models need further enhancements and more verification and validation, 2) these models 
are concerned mainly with economic interdependency among civil infrastructure 
networks for disaster management applications, 3) the above stated models also 
overlook vulnerability assessment during the economic analysis, 4) these models are 
mainly utilized to experiment with “what if” scenarios for intervention at bundle level 
only and 5) the models were not supplemented with optimization techniques to allocate 
the intervention actions to decrease the need to extensive  experts’ knowledge. 
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2.2.3 Limitations of Interdependency Models 
The limitations of the above stated interdependency models can be summirized 
as the following: 
1- For spatial interdependency models (Tushith and Moselhi, 2012 and Shehata 
2013): these models overlook functional interdependencies among civil 
infrastructure assets and don’t consider their effect along with spatial 
interdependencies on increasing or decreasing assets’ vulnerability.  
2- For functional interdependency models (Crucittia et al., 2003; Gesara and 
Osorio, 2010; Wu et al., 2014):  
a. These models overlook the effect of assets’ condition on functional 
interdependency. 
b. Such models are designed and implemented for disaster management 
applications.  
c. These models are focusing on capturing functional interdepndent 
assets but do not attempt at allocating intervention actions based on 
the captured interdependencies.   
3- For economical interdepdencny models: in this category, two types of 
models were discussed; IO models (Haimes et al., 2001; Haimes and Jiang 
2001; Santos and Haimes, 2004) and simulation models (Macal & Macal, 
2005, Dudenhoeffer et al., 2006; Stapelberg, 2011). The above sited IO  
models suffer from the following;  
a.  The need for extensive data mining and experts opinions in order to 
estimate the required inputs. 
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b. Such models were designed and implemented for disaster 
management applications.  
c. Lack of computational models to optimize intervention actions based 
on the captured degree of economical interdependency.  
On the other hand, the simulation models suffer from the following:  
a) The majority of these models are either conceptual or still under 
development and thus such models need further enhancements and more 
verification and validation,  
b) These models are concerned mainly with economic interdependency among 
civil infrastructure networks for disaster management applications. 
c) The above stated models also overlook vulnerability assessment from the 
economic analysis. 
d) These models were mainly utilized to experiment with what-if scenarios for 
intervention at the bundle level only.  
e) These models are not supplemented with optimization techniques to  
allocate the intervention actions to decrease the need to extensive  experts’ 
knowledge. 
2.3 Vulnerability Assessment 
Vulnerability assessment measures an asset’s degree of susceptibility for 
structural and/or functional failures triggered by failure of these functions in neighboring 
assets. In the past decade, researchers tried to assess the vulnerability of infrastructure 
networks in different contexts (i.e. social, engineering, economical …etc.). The 
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following part of the literature review focuses on the current state of the art for 
vulnerability assessment models in engineering applications and more specifically in 
disaster management and asset management. The following two subsections extract 
vulnerability definitions, classifications and illustrate how some of these classifications 
were modeled. 
2.3.1 Vulnerability Classification 
Vulnerability has various definitions based on the perspective of the analyst. 
Vulnerability may be defined as “The extent to which a community, structure, services 
or geographic area is likely to be damaged or disrupted by the impact of particular 
hazard, on account of their nature, construction and proximity to hazardous terrains or a 
disaster prone area.” (Khan et al., 2011). Blaikie et al. (1994) defines the vulnerability 
as “the characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope 
with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural hazard”. The National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 2002) views vulnerability as: “susceptibility of 
resources to negative impacts from hazard events”.  
Vulnerabilities have different classifications also based on the field and the 
purpose of the study. For instance, Khan et al. (2011) categorized vulnerabilities into 
physical and socio-economic vulnerability to analyze natural disaster impacts. Physical 
vulnerability includes notions of whom and what may be damaged or destroyed by 
natural hazard such as earthquakes or floods. It is based on the physical condition of 
people and other elements at risk (i.e. buildings, infrastructure …etc.) based on their 
proximity to hazard and nature of the hazard. On the other hand, socio-economic 
vulnerability may be related to the population affected by a specific hazard in terms of 
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tangible and intangible losses based on the demographic characteristics of the impacted 
area. For instance, people who are considered as low income and living in coastal areas 
may favor construction of vulnerable types of housing such as wood housing and hence 
they are generally at risk of losing their shelters whenever there is strong wind or 
cyclone. Ouyang et al. (2009) classified the vulnerability of interdependent 
infrastructures into two types of vulnerability: structural vulnerability and functional 
vulnerability. The reason for such classification was to consider the vulnerability of 
interdependent infrastructure assets under terrorist attacks.  
2.3.2 Vulnerability Assessment Models 
Vulnerability assessment is systematic procedure for assessing susceptibility of 
infrastructure networks based on captured interdependencies among neighboring assets. 
In disaster management, the goal of performing the vulnerability assessment exercise is 
to determine the adequacy of security measures, identify security deficiencies, evaluate 
security alternatives, and verify the adequacy of such measures after implementation 
(Earl et al., 2004). A disaster is a result of a combination of hazard, vulnerability and 
insufficient capacity or measures to reduce the potential chances of risk. As the degree 
of vulnerability of an asset increases, the hazard impacts are increasing causing 
economic and social damages and disruption. Therefore, risk assessment is a function 
of hazard and vulnerability and measures the possibility of future harm based on the 
present state. Each system component is being assessed to evaluate the susceptibility of 
the various system components to a certain hazard.  
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Subsequently, these vulnerable components are being evaluated based on the 
vulnerability consequences (social, economic, political etc.) along with the likelihood of 
such hazard. Such evaluation will form a crisp idea about the system risk characteristics 
due to hazards and current system capacity. Generally, the vulnerability assessment 
models can be classified into; models overlooking interdependencies (Ezell, 2005; 
Karmakar et al., 2010; Flax et al., 2003; Wu et al., 2014; Laucelli and Giustolisi, 2014) 
and models considering interdependencies (Ouyang et al., 2009; Arboleda et al., 2010; 
Eun et al., 2010 ). 
Figure 2-6 Vulnerability assessment and risk assessment process (Baker, 2003) 
For vulnerability models overlooking interdependencies, Karmakar et al. (2010) 
presented a study for vulnerability analysis of infrastructure due to floods by considering 
four types of infrastructure attributes: 1) physical, 2) economic, 3) infrastructure and 4) 
social. Such attributes are evaluated individually using a Geographic Information 
System (GIS) environment and the impact on infrastructure vulnerability is estimated 
based on its effect on critical facilities, emergency service stations and bridges. The 
components of vulnerability are combined to determine an overall vulnerability to flood. 
The values of probability of occurrence of flood, vulnerability to flood, and exposures 
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of land use and soil type to flood are used to finally compute flood risk at different 
locations in a watershed. The objectives of this model were to provide a DSS to: develop 
land development plans and land use zoning; plan emergency response strategies; select 
waste disposal sites and prepare infrastructure budgetary decisions. Flood risk is a 
combination of potential damage and probability of flooding. In this study, flood risk is 
the product of probability of occurrence (Pe), vulnerability to flood (V), and exposures 
of land use (ELand) and soil permeability (ESoil) as shown: 
Flood Risk= Pe * V * E …….……………………………………………Equation 2-5 
The model framework is shown in Figure 2-7 where the four vulnerability factors 
are assessed separately. For instance, the physical vulnerability is assessed by the 
structural vulnerability of the assets or facilities during the flooding. On the other hand, 
for social vulnerability in a specific area, the income, ethnicity, household 
structure…etc. are used to measure the overall impact of a flood on a certain area.   
Economic vulnerability includes flood damage indicators which can be 
expressed in monetary terms. Infrastructure vulnerability includes civil structure such as 
road networks, railways, and road bridges. Infrastructure components are important to 
the movement of population, communications, and safety. Their inundation impedes 
traffic and hinders communications, increasing stress in the exposed population. 
Inundation may also block important emergency routes and cause physical damage to 
roads. Afterwards, vulnerability indices along hazard probability of occurrence and 
Impact of exposure will be used to see the overall vulnerability index for certain region. 




Figure 2-7 Framework for vulnerability and risk assessment (Karmakar, et al., 2010) 
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The Community vulnerability assessment tool (CVAT) is another tool for 
vulnerability assessment that overlooks interdependencies among civil infrastructure. 
The CVAT tool was designed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration’s Coastal Services Center (Flax et al., 2003). CAVT was introduced to 
assist emergency managers and planners in their efforts to reduce hazard vulnerabilities 
through hazard mitigation, comprehensive land-use, and development planning. CVAT 
analysis results provide a baseline to prioritize mitigation measures and to evaluate the 
effectiveness of those measures over time. Prior to each analysis, hazard identification 
must be performed by the working group to formulate a general list of hazards (i.e 
natural, manmade and technological). The outcome of this step will result in a prioritized 
list of hazards, based on the concerns and perceptions of the community. The CVAT 
model uses the following scoring equation to rate the vulnerability of an infrastructure:  
Vulnerability = (Frequency +Area Impact)*Potential Damage Magnitude 
……………………………………………………………………………Equation 2-6 
Total Score for the frequency, area impact, and potential damage magnitude 
values are defined on a scale of numbers from 1 to 5, where 1 is low and 5 is high. This 
scoring system is subjective to facilitate the use of the tool for different users’ types. The 
ArcGIS maps will be used later to identify vulnerabilities and mitigation options for a 
specific hazard. In the critical facilities analysis, the focus is on determining the 
vulnerabilities of key individual facilities, lifelines, or resources within the community. 
Critical facilities may include emergency shelters, schools, hospitals, public buildings, 
police stations, utilities …etc., or those identified as critical by the working group. 
Because it is not usually feasible to conduct a structural and operational analysis for 
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every structure in a community, this step helps to prioritize which facilities are most 
vulnerable, so that individual assessments may be performed later.  
Ezell (2005) proposed a model that requires experts’ judgment to rate 
vulnerability of water networks using simple scoring method. The model considered 
four factors to rate the functional vulnerability of water assets. Wu et al. (2014) 
presented a model to calculate vulnerability of water channels considering three factors: 
channel connectivity, transportation efficiency and economic loss. The authors used 
analytical hierarchy process (AHP) with a hypothetical case study to assess vulnerability 
of water channels. Laucelli and Giustolisi (2014) presented a methodology to analyze 
vulnerability of water distribution networks for seismic events by using fragility curves 
and network topography in order to separate the network segments where failures may 
occur, using a hypothetical case study. 
The above stated models for vulnerability assessment without considering 
interdependencies ( Ezell, 2005; Karmakar et al., 2010; Flax et al., 2003; Wu et al., 2014; 
Laucelli and Giustolisi, 2014) have the following limitations: 
1- The above cited methods are designed and implemented ignoring the 
underlying spatial and functional interdependencies that exist between water, 
sewer and road networks.  
2- Vulnerability and interdependency modeling target, primarily, disaster 
management applications.  
3- The majority of these models are subjective and require extensive 
involvement from the experts in rating vulnerability of infrastructure 
networks except for Laucelli and Giustolisi (2014). 
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4- These models do not present a systematic approach in allocation intervention 
actions for the likely vulnerable infrastructure networks on bundle and 
network level.   
For vulnerability models considering interdependencies, Arboleda et al. (2010) 
presented a SD model to evaluate vulnerability of health care systems based on 
interdependencies with neighbouring civil infrastructure networks for disaster response 
plans. Physical damage to health care facilities or disruption of their operations or supply 
chains could prevent a full, effective response to a disaster and exacerbate the outcome 
of an emergency situation. In this study, three models (normal operations, response to a 
disruption, and restoration) are used to assess the level of interdependencies between the 
health care facility and the primary infrastructure systems linked to the facility 
(Arboleda et al., 2010). Arboleda et al. (2010) used optimization techniques to determine 
the unsatisfied demand in the major infrastructure systems and the impact of this 
shortage of resources on the operation of the hospital. A system dynamics simulation 
model is used as a tool to represent the operation of a health care facility, including the 
interaction between the different service areas (emergency room, intensive care unit, 
wards, operation room), the flow of patients within the facility, and the condition of the 
infrastructure systems that supply resources (i.e., water, power, medical supplies) to 
maintain the operation of the facility. The model objective was to assist in determining 
cost effective operational strategies in a health care facility in order to respond to a 
disaster event. The model was implemented using Vensim PLE software for SD 
(Arboleda et al., 2010). 
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Ouyang et al. (2009) introduced a methodological approach to comprehensively 
analyze the vulnerability of interdependent infrastructure networks (Figure 2-8). In this 
approach, two types of vulnerability were considered: structural vulnerability and 
functional vulnerability. The interdependent infrastructure topologies were generated 
based on geographical proximity. For this model, Vulnerability was related to attacks 
(manmade hazards) which decrease the efficiency of the infrastructures. Topology 
Extraction means converting the infrastructure drawings using graph theory principles 
to a graph G = {V, E} with N nodes, V = {vi} is the set of vertices and E is the set of 
edges, denote d (vi,vj) by the shortest path lengths connecting two nodes in the network. 
Consequently, this extraction or digitizing is used to simulate the infrastructures 
structural and functional interdependency. 
 
Figure 2-8 Vulnerability assessment model (Ouyang et al., 2009) 
 
Eun et al. (2010) presented a decision support system (DSS) using Bayesian 
Network theory and System Dynamics (SD) method for vulnerability assessment of 
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critical infrastructure as shown in Figure 2-9. The objective of this model was to support 
emergency agencies and industries in preparing customized mitigation strategies and 
plans for preparedness, response, and recovery using the criticality and vulnerability 
analyses. The Bayesian Network theory was introduced to estimate the probability of 
failure of different infrastructures to different hazards. Vensim PLE software, was used 
as a tool for the simulation. There are three types of variables in the model: constant, 
auxiliary, and level. The sources of flood and other information (topographical 
conditions, water pressure …, etc.) are examples of constant variables which provide 
basic information of the flood and the conditions of infrastructure as initial values as 
shown in Figure 2-9. The box nodes are all auxiliary variables except Diamond V which 
is a level variable. Auxiliary variables calculate the vulnerability by combining the 
values from constant variables and transfer the result to associated auxiliary and level 
variables. 
Figure 2-9 SD model for vulnerability assessment (Eun et al., 2010) 
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2.3.3 Limitations of Vulnerability Models  
The vulnerability models discussed in previous section suffer from the 
following: 
1- For vulnerability models overlooking interdependencies (Ezell, 2005; 
Karmakar et al., 2010; Flax et al., 2003; Wu et al., 2014; Laucelli and 
Giustolisi, 2014): 
a. The above cited methods are designed and implemented ignoring the 
underlying interdependencies among civil infrastructure networks. 
b.  Vulnerability modeling target, primarily, disaster management 
applications.  
c. The majority of these models are subjective and required extensive 
involvement from the experts in rating vulnerability of infrastructure 
networks except for Laucelli and Giustolisi (2014). 
d. These models don’t present a systematic approach in allocation 
intervention actions for the likely vulnerable infrastructure assets on 
bundle and network level.   
2- For vulnerability models considering interdependences (Ouyang et al., 2009; 
Arboleda et al., 2010; Eun et al., 2010 ):  
a. When assessing spatial and functional vulnerability, these models 
ignore important factors like; asset condition, soil type, neighboring 
asset condition, customer types ...etc. These factors and others may 
have an effect on increasing or decreasing vulnerability of 
interdependent assets in asset management framework. Further effort 
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is needed in order to incorporate vulnerability assessment into the 
asset management cycle.  
b. The reviewed vulnerability models focus on mainly assessing 
vulnerability of interdependent assets however few of these models 
provided a framework for allocating intervention actions on bundle 
level only. 
c.  These models focus on assessing one type of vulnerability (i.e. 
functional or structural or economic …etc.) except for Ouyang et al. 
(2009). However, Ouyang et al. (2009) model is designed and 
implemented for disaster management application.    
2.4 Intervention Actions 
2.4.1 Water and Sewer Networks  
 Intervention practices aim at maintaining or improving the performance of 
buried infrastructures in terms of quality of service, hydraulic capacity and structural 
resiliency. All rehabilitation techniques make use of the pipe earthier as a part of the 
rehabilitated system (renovation) or as convenient for the new pipe (replacement). A 
hierarchy of maintenance operations can be identified such that failure to carry out work 
at one level will often lead to the need to carry out work at a higher and more expensive 
level at a later date. A simple hierarchy for sewer maintenance can be defined as follows 
by (InfraGuide (2003), Abbott (2005), Hastak, (2002)): 
 Level 1 - Routine and periodic cleaning (pre-emptive), if this is not carried out 
it may lead to level 2 Maintenance requirements. 
41 
 
 Level 2 - Unblocking pipes (reactive),  
 Level 3 - Local repair and root control (pre-emptive with the need to be identified 
through sewer inspections). If this is not done it may lead to level 4 maintenance. 
 Level 4 - Relining. Failure to reline when required could lead to collapse and the 
need to completely replace the pipe (level 5). 
 Level 5 - Replacement. 
In case of replacement, the operators have the chance to choose between open 
cut method and trenchless technologies. Open cut method Involves digging a trench 
along the proposed pipeline route, placing the pipe in the trench on a suitable bedding 
material, and then backfilling. This method is well documented, and most municipalities 
have good design and construction specifications for these types of projects 
(Infragauide, 2003). The installation of new replacement pipe should only be undertaken 
when the review of all alternate technologies has been completed and the open cut 
method is ranked as the best alternative. The benefits of such method according to 
InfraGuide (2003) are the following:  
1. Completed with all new appurtenances.  
2. The water and wastewater mains can be aligned to meet the needs of the local 
area.  
3. The Water and wastewater service lines can be upgraded in material and 
diameter, and lowered to meet current standards.  
4. Water and wastewater main sizing can be changed to meet current and future 
maximum day and fire flow requirements for water mains.  
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5. Other infrastructure can be rehabilitated or replaced at the same time, 
allowing for coordinated work and sharing of costs.  
The disadvantages of such method according to InfraGuide (2003) are: 
1. The cost of the open cut method can be substantial compared to some of 
the newer technologies.  
2. The construction duration may be considerably longer than most 
trenchless technologies because of the amount of disturbance to other 
infrastructure and traffic, as well as the amount of reinstatement work 
required following the installation of the water and wastewater mains.  
3. There are more safety concerns due to traffic issues on road right-of-
ways, the number of excavations required, and the large, heavy 
equipment needed to perform the work.  
4. There can be significant disturbance to other surface and buried 
infrastructure which may result in costly relocations.  
5. Social and environmental costs of major open cut projects may be 
substantial during construction.  
On the contrary, trenchless technologies are methodologies allowing new 
underground pipe routing with minimum disruption to the surrounding media i.e. 
(traffic, nearby utilities, building….etc.) (Abbott, 2005). Additionally, trenchless 
technologies can be installed to improve the hydraulic performance of certain parts of 
the networks or water quality levels for coping with customers’ expectations (Hastak, 
2002). Trenchless technologies are advanced over the conventional open-cut method in 
the following:  
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 Minimize traffic disruption (Abbott, 2005). 
 Less exposed work site which results in improved construction safety (Hastak, 
2002). 
 Eliminates need for pavement restoration (Infraguide, 2003). 
 Minimizes chance of disturbing existing utilities (Abbott, 2005). 
 Minimizes damage to nearby buildings (InfraGuide, 2003). 
 Less disruption to the public (noise, pollution, etc…) (Abbott, 2005). 
Generally, trenchless technologies can be classified into trenchless construction 
methods and trenchless rehabilitation methods. Trenchless construction methods are 
deployed either to rout a new pipe into service or to replace an in-service pipe with 
































Essentially, trenchless renewable technologies are used to improve the hydraulic 
performance and decrease the structural deterioration of a pipeline. Infraguide (2003) 
determines a number of items that should be considered before selecting a rehabilitation 
or replacement technology for remedial action, those items can be articulated as follows:  
1. Construction related issues, such as safety, operability, cost, and efficiency.  
2. The size and duration of the contract.  Smaller contracts may exclude some 
alternatives due to the cost of mobilizing specialized equipment and personnel. 
On contrary, major rehabilitation projects enlarge the analysis of alternatives for 
cost effective rehabilitation decisions. 
3. The risk of undertaking (or not undertaking) the project: In this task, the focus is 
on environmental and construction concerns and what may adversely affect the 
project’s objective.  
4. Local availability of the various technologies: this inherently affects the projects 
in terms of mobilization costs and personal expertise related costs. Careful 
economic and engineering assessment should be conducted to balance between 
costs and benefits of such technique.  
5. The depth of desired pipeline: this may limit the technologies available to 
rehabilitate or replace for certain water and wastewater main.  
6. The density of water and wastewater services: this may substantially increase the 
overall cost of construction of some of the newer technologies as excavations are 
required to reconnect each water service and by lateral pipes.  
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7. Water main material: The selection of the water or wastewater main material 
may have an impact on the rehabilitation or replacement technology. There are 
various water and wastewater main materials on the market for new pipe and 
rehabilitation technologies. Expansion and contraction (i.e. creep) is a factor that 
must be considered when selecting and designing the water or wastewater main. 
8. The density of lateral connections: this can substantially increase the overall cost 
of construction of some of the newer technologies, if excavations are required to 
reconnect the water or sewer laterals. 
9.  Roadway conditions (traffic volumes, surface conditions, and remedial 
requirements): this may encourage or discourage the open cut method based on 
the economic analysis and construction related issues. 
As the hydraulic and operational practices for water pipelines are different from 
wastewater pipelines, some rehabilitation techniques are preferred for certain categories 
over the other. More details about trenchless techniques can be found in the 2001 
AWWA manual, Infraguide (2003) and Abbott (2005). 
2.4.2 Road Networks  
Generally speaking, road network mitigation actions can be classified into: 
 Localized M&R: Applying a repair method to a small localized area of a 
pavement. Usually suitable when deterioration is only localized and typically 
has a minimal impact on extending the service life of the pavement. 
 Globalized M&R: Application of a repair method to a large portion of the 
pavement section. This technique is more suitable when deterioration is more 
widespread and provides a small extension in pavement service life. 
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 Major M&R: Considered a full rehabilitation of the existing asphalt or base 
course. This technique provides a large extension in pavement service life 
and typically the most costly type of intervention.  
2.5 Research Methods 
In the following subsections, a comprehensive literature review is offered to 
cover the research techniques utilized in the research methodology. The fuzzy set theory 
covers the basics of fuzzy set theory and offers a comprehensive literature review of 
fuzzy models used in the field of infrastructure management. Artificial neural networks 
in theory and methodology is covered and a comparison is presented to demonstrate the 
advantages and disadvantages of each technique. The fuzzy set theory and artificial 
neural network will lay out the basics for fuzzy neuro adaptive networks.  
2.5.1 Fuzzy Set Theory 
To deal with vagueness of human thought, Zadeh (1965) first introduced fuzzy 
set theory which is based on the rationality of uncertainty due to impression or 
vagueness. A major contribution of fuzzy set theory is its capability of representing 
vague knowledge. A fuzzy set A is characterized by set of pairs {x, mA(x)} where x is 
a member of a collection of objects, and mA(x) is the grade of membership or 
membership function. Membership function represents the grade of possibility that an 
element x belongs to the set A. It follows that a membership function is a possibility 
function and not a probability function, which is usually defined subjectively (Buckley, 
2005). Fuzzy set theory has the ability to realize a complex nonlinear input–output 
relation as a synthesis of multiple simple input–output relations (Zadeh, 1965).  
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The simple input–output relation is described in each rule. The boundary of the 
rule areas is not sharp but fuzzy. The system output from one rule area to the next rule 
area gradually changes. Another feature of fuzzy sets is the ability to separate logic and 
fuzziness (Yuan, 1995). Since conventional two-value logic-based systems cannot do 
this, their rules are modified when either logic or fuzziness should be changed (Zadeh, 
1965). The fuzzy set modifies fuzzy rules when logic should be changed and modifies 
membership functions which define fuzziness when fuzziness should be changed. Fuzzy 
set theory was used by many researchers in the asset management to address certain 
concerns. Fares ( 2005) used hierachical fuzzy expert system to rate the risk for water 
mains considering three factors (physical, environmental and operational). Salman 
(2010) proposed a fuzzy model to assess the risk consequences for wastewater 
collections based on physical, environmental, and operational factors by conducting 
interviews with experts and ussing elicted opnions to fomulate knowledge base system. 
The knowledge base sytem is connected to ArcGIS to facilitate the visualization of the 
risk rating using the fuzzy expert system. Validation to the proposed system was 
conducted by experts interviews. Kleiner et al. (2005) proposed a fuzzy expert system 
to to interpret distress indicators, observed during inspection and/or non-destructive 
evaluation (NDE) session, to obtain a condition rating of water transmission mains. This 
method considered both scarce field data and expert opinion. To build a fuzzy logic 
inference model five steps are needed (Ross, 2010): 
1. Fuzzification of the inputs. 
2. Applying fuzzy operators. 
3. Applying implication method. 
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4. Aggregating all the output. 
5. Defuzzification. 
The theoretical background for each of the above mentioned steps is discussed 
comprehensively in Appendix A. 
2.5.2 Artificial Neural Networks 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are composed of simple elements called 
neurons operating in parallel and organized in layers inspired by biological nervous 
systems. In ANN, there is an input layer, a hidden layer and an output layer. The input 
layer is the model parameter to be considered in the analysis whereas the output layer 
represents the decision to be made. As in nature, the network function is determined 
largely by the connections between elements. The network training is performed to 
adjust the values of the connections (weights) between elements as shown in 
Figure 2-11. The aim of ANN training is that a particular input leads to a specific target 
output where the network is adjusted based on a comparison of the output and the target, 
until the network output matches the target. Hidden layers structures and numbers is 
determined using trial and error which is an acceptable practice used by many 
researchers (Hegzay & Ayed, 1998; Fahmy & Moselhi, 2009; Moselhi, Hegazy, & 
Fazio, 1991; Khan, Zayed, & Moselhi, 2010). The main advantage of ANN is the 
deployment of historical data for training the input neurons and modifying the neurons 
weights until they reach an output close enough to the original historical record of such 
output. The fundamental building block for neural networks is the single-input neuron, 
such as shown in Figure 2-11. There are three distinct functional operations that take 
place in this example neuron. First, the scalar input I is multiplied by the scalar weight 
49 
 
w to form the product wI, again a scalar. Second, the weighted input wI is added to the 
scalar bias b to form the net input n. (In this case, you can view the bias as shifting the 
function f to the left by an amount X. The bias is much like a weight, except that it has a 
constant input of 1. Finally, the net input is passed through the transfer function f, which 
produces the scalar output O. The names given to these three processes are: the weight 
function, the net input function and the transfer function. 
Figure 2-11 Schematic ANN (Hegazy and Ayed, 1998) 
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The weight (w) and bias (b) are both adjustable scalar parameters of the neuron. The 
central idea  of neural networks is that such parameters can be adjusted so that the 
network exhibits some desired or interesting behavior (Achim, Ghotb, & McManus, 
2007). Thus, the network training concerns particularly with adjusting the weight or bias 
parameters to map from inputs to output. Least Mean Square Error is used to measure 
the difference between the ANN output and original output by the following equation: 
𝐸 =  ∑ ( 𝑂 − 𝑡)2𝑛𝑛=1  ……………………………………………………….Equation 2-7 
2.5.3 Optimization Models 
Optimization problems may be defined as the couple (S, F) where S is a set of feasible 
solution and F:S→R is  the objective function to be optimized for set for solutions in set 
S. A solution is said to be global optimal solution (s*) if it has a better value for objective 
functions than all other solutions in the search space (∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝐹(𝑠 ∗) ≥ 𝐹(𝑠)). Roughly, 
optimization models can be classified into exact and non-exact solution.  
Exact solutions can be grouped into linear and non-linear programming models. Linear 
models are models with continuous decision variables that formulate with set of 
constrains the search space. In linear programming, the set of constrains and the 
objectives function are linear functions and there are many algorithms that can be used 
to find the optimal solutions for such problems (Hillier and Lieberman, 2004; Taha, 
2008).  Although this assumption essentially holds for numerous practical problems, it 
frequently does not hold and therefore, the non-linear programming is suitable for such 
cases (Hillier and Lieberman, 2004). Nonlinear programming includes many techniques 
to find the optimal solution based on the nature of the problem and whether the problem 
is constrained or not. Non-linear programming techniques include; the one-dimensional 
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search procedure, multivariable unconstrained optimization, the gradient search 
procedure, quadratic programming and non-convex programming. Each one of these 
non-linear programming techniques can be used in certain situations with certain 
limitations. Covering all the advantages and disadvantages of these techniques is out of 
scope for this research as it is covered comprehensively in many operations research text 
books (Hillier and Lieberman, 2004; Taha, 2008). However, the primarily common 
disadvantages of these types of techniques are: 1) they require large computational time 
when the search space increases 2) they possess significant mathematical complexity in 
problem formulation and procedures for algorithm solution for large spaces.  
Infrastructure systems are considered as large scale systems that require near 
optimal solution that satisfies decision makers objectives in reasonable computational 
time. Hence, non-exact methods are appropriate when the objective is to find optimal 
solutions over large space of water, sewer and road assets. The search space in such case 
is considered complex because of the huge number of decisions variables available 
besides large number of alternatives that is available for each decision variable as will 
be shown in in Chapter 3. Genetic Algorithm is a suitable optimization technique over 
single populations’ algorithms like tabu-search, local search procedure, simulated 
annealing for number of reasons. Genetic Algorithm allows for exploration of wide 
search space, operators to improve characteristics of the search space and provides the 
decision makers with a list of near optimal solutions in case of multi-objectives 
optimizations (Talbi, 2009).    
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2.6 Summary and Limitations in Current Research  
In this chapter, an extensive overview was provided to cover the current state of 
the art of interdependency and vulnerability assessment research and models. The 
interdependency classifications were reviewed comprehensively and subsequently 
interdependency models were classified into: spatial, functional and economical models. 
The interdependency models’ foundation, inputs, processes, outputs and limitations 
were discussed. The vulnerability assessment basics and models were reviewed along 
with their required inputs, processes, outputs and limitations of each model. Following 
the vulnerability assessment, current state of art for water, sewer and road rehabilitation 
and replacement were presented as well. To conclude, the main limitations in the current 
state of art of asset management can be summarized as following:  
1- Previous DSS for rehabilitation and maintenance policies were primarily 
implemented ignoring underlying spatial and functional interdependencies that 
exist between water, sewer and road networks. 
2- For interdependency models, current models were oriented towards assessing 
functional and/or economic interdependencies between various interacted 
networks for disaster management (Santos & Haimes, 2004; Osorio et al., 2010; 
Karmakaret al., 2010; Roshani and Filion, 2014). In asset management, decision 
makers maintain public capital intensive assets to meets customers’ expectations 
not only to avoid catastrophic failures.  
3- For vulnerability models, current state of the art focuses on studying 
independently factors affecting vulnerability due to spatial interdependency and 
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function interdependency (Roshani and Filion, 2014; Mandapaka et al., 2012; 
Wei et al, 2009). 
4- For interdependency and vulnerability models: 
i.  Previous studies fail to objectively allocate the diminished resources for 
intervention policies on network levels (Ezell, 2005; Ouyang et al., 2009; 
Osorio et al., 2010). 
ii. Previous studies did not consider operation and maintenance reports of 
civil infrastructure networks in understanding causes for increasing or 
decreasing vulnerability of interdependent assets.  
iii. Previous studies considered primarily hypothetical examples or small 
size networks and did not test the stability and suitability to real large 












Chapter 3 : DATA COLLECTION 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, two datasets were analyzed not only to understand current 
practices of asset management but also to structure and develop the proposed framework 
and its models. Two datasets were obtained from the Cities of London and Hamilton in 
Ontario, Canada. Each dataset was analyzed using the statistical toolbox of MATLAB 
2013. The objective was to; 1) understand what data attributes were utilized in each city, 
2) analyze each city practices in configuring and storing collected data, 3) determine 
which factors are influencing vulnerability assessment of water, sewer and road assets 
based on operation and maintenance reports, 4) summarize common observations found 
among the two case studies and 5) if possible, discuss the list of selected factors for 
vulnerability assessment with common observations with cities officials. Figure 3-1 
shows an overview of the sections covered in this chapter. 
 
Figure 3-1 Chapter 3 overview 
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3.2 Remarks on Data Collection Process 
The following should be noted on the data collection process: 
1. The state of infrastructure (SOI) reports for both cities were utilized to gain 
insights into the current state of water, sewer and road infrastructure networks.  
The 2013 SOI report was available for the City of London. The 2005 and 2009 
SOI reports were available for the City of Hamilton but its dataset was updated 
till 2005.  
2. For City of Hamilton: 
a. Only datasets for water network and road network were available. The 
water network dataset had 6 attributes and the road network dataset had 
5 attributes. 
b. The operation and maintenance reports were available for water assets 
only.  
3. For City of London: 
a. Datasets for water, sewer and road assets were available. The water and 
sewer network dataset had 11 attributes and the road network dataset had 
6 attributes. 
b. The operation and maintenance reports were available for water and 
sewer assets.  
3.3 City of London 
The city of London according to the 2013 SOI report owns; 1) water network of 
1,570 km with total replacement value of $2.7 billion, 2) sewer network of 1,430 km 
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with replacement value of 2 billion, 3) road network of 3,717 km with replacement cost 
of 1.8 billion. The collected datasets consists of 9145 datasets for road network, 44973 
for sewer network and 24567 for water network as shown in Figures (3-2, 3-3, 3-4).  








Figure 3-4 Road network, London, Ontario 
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Only 1895 road datasets, 10500 sewer datasets and 2500 water datasets were 
used after removing incomplete records. The condition of the three assets was measured 
on 5 points scale (very poor, poor, fair, good and very good) as shown in Figure 3-5. By 
examining closely Figure 3-5, the majority of water, sewer and road assets were found 
to be below fair.  Summary of some statistical measurements for water, sewer and road 
network of are shown in Tables (3-1 to 3-4). 
Figure 3-5 Condition ratings for water, sewer and road assets (SOI, 2013).  
Table 3-1 Quantitative data attributes for water network, City of London 
Attribute Mean Min Max Sdv 
Age (years) 62.02 28 137 17.44 
Breakage rate (breaks/year/m) 0.012 5.4*10-5 0.59 0.02 
Depth (ft) 5.88 0.5 1.5 1.08 
Length (m) 211.41 2.1 840 145.72 
Pipe Diameter (mm) 163.44 50 900 51.06 



























Very Good Good Fair Poor Very Poor
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Table 3-2 Qualitative data attributes for water network, City of London 
Attribute Values percentages 
Pipe Material 
Cast Iron 93.83 
CPP 0.16 
Ductile Iron 5.55 
Galvanized Pipe 0.08 
PVC 0.19 








Backfill Material 2.34 
 
Table 3-3 Quantitative data attributes for sewer dataset, City of London 
Attribute Mean Min Max Sdv 
Length (m) 62.1269 0.22743 2237.14 46.27263 
Age (years) 70.1 12 110 35.1 
Depth (ft) 2.617896 0 15.6 1.660014 
Diameter (mm) 455.8864 150 7000 362.142 
 
Table 3-4 Qualitative data attributes for road dataset, City of London 
Attribute Values percentages 
Road Type Paved 98.80 
Gravel 0.45 
Tar and Gravel 0.45 
Concrete 0.31 
Traffic Type Heavy 14.25 
Medium 29.67 
Light 56.08 
Operation and maintenance reports for water assets and sewer assets were 
analysed.  These operation and maintenance reports include the following data: 
1- Asset condition. 
2- Construction date. 
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3- Replacement date. 
4- Road condition. 
5- Description of breakage; rotten, blowout, corrosion 
cracked around ….....etc. 
6- Causes of breakage; contractor, corrosion, pressure…etc. 
7- Damages due to breakage; road surface, shoulder of the 
road, road cut …..etc. 
When analyzing operation and maintenance reports for the water network, it was 
found that most of failure records were due to corrosion, settlement, deterioration of 
pipe condition and improper bedding as shown in Figure 3-6. The majority of these 
failures were for pipes with diameter less than 200mm and length less than 400m. Most 
failures were encountered in clay soil, 60.4%, and sand soil, 25.5%. Cast iron pipes 
occupied around 93.3% of failure records in City of London data. Based on the 2013 
SOI report, water and sewer pipes installed in the 1930’s through the 1970’s are 
experiencing very high rate of failure. 
Figure 3-6 Failure causes for water mains 
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The design of the water database is shown in Figure 3-7. Each water asset, 
feature class, is designed to have its physical and functional attributes stored in a separate 
table. The table is located inside the ArcGIS geodatabase and it is called feature attribute 
table. Any feature class can have only one geographic location and therefore each feature 
attribute table is connected to one geographic table and such relationship is said to be 
one to one (1 to 1) as shown in Figure 3-7. The same design is maintained for the 
operation and maintenance reports as each asset has only one corresponding report (1 to 
1). The sewer network database had the same water database configuration shown in 
Figure 3-7. The configuration of the road network database is shown in Figure 3-8. The 
road database has also similar configuration to the sewer and water databases. The only 
difference is that road assets in City of London were not attached to operation and 
maintenance reports like the water and sewer assets.  
 





















Construction Dates Replacement Date
Causes of Breakage










Figure 3-8 Road database configuration, London 
3.4 City of Hamilton 
The collected data presented in this section is for the City of Hamilton water 
distribution and road network as shown in Figure 3-9. City of Hamilton owns 1950 km 
of water assets with replacement value of CAD 1.82 billion and 3000 km of road assets 
with replacement value of CAD 3.25 billion (SOI Report, 2005). The collected datasets 
consists of 37,502 datasets for sewer network, 43,031 for water network and 12,350 for 
road network. After removing incomplete records, 7,502 datasets for sewer network, 
10,031 for water network and 6,000 for road network were considered for the statistical 
analysis. Summary of some statistical observations for water assets are shown in 


























Table 3-5 Quantitative data attributes for water datasets, City of Hamilton 
Attribute  Mean Min Max Sdv 
Age (years) 59.73 8 113 21.08 
Buried Depth (m) 1.56 0 2.1 0.17 
Flow pressure(psi) 31.61 0 95 24.36 
Length (m) 62.15 0.3 472 75.13 
 
Table 3-6 Qualitative data attributes for water datasets, City of Hamilton 
Attribute Values Percentages 
Pipe Material 
Cast Iron 88 
Ductile Iron 5 
High Density Polyethylene (HDPE) 5 









The asset condition of water network and road network is measured on scale of 1 to 5 
where 1 is excellent condition and 5 is failure condition. Operation and maintenance 
reports for water assets and sewer assets were analysed.  These operation and 
maintenance reports include the following data: 
1- Asset condition. 
2- Construction date. 
3- Replacement date. 








Unlike City of London, no information was included about the causes of each 
pipe failure, description of the breakage and damages caused by pipe failure. Most of 
the failure records were encountered for pipes with diameter less than 150mm. Cast iron 
pipes occupied 88.2% of failure records. The majority of these failure records, 83.7 %, 
were in sand soil and with pipe length less than 200m. It should be noted that the 2009 
SOI report was available but the 2005 SOI was used for City of Hamilton as the provided 
datasets were updated till 2005.   
The configuration of the water database is shown in Figure 3-10 . By observing 
the two datasets, both cities have similar practices in storing the collected data for the 
three assets. Physical and functional factors are stored in one table and the same is true 
for operation and maintenance reports if available. 
 






























3.5 Common Observations on the Collected Data  
Based on the statistical analysis of operation and maintenance reports and 
discussion with three of cities officials, the following observations were found common 
in the two datasets: 
Observation 1: Most of water and sewer failures were attributed to pipe material, soil 
conditions, uneven manufacturing quality, installation practices, and traffic loading. 
a) Most failure records, approximately 85%, were for pipes with small and mid-
size diameter. 
b) Most failure records, 60% for London and 80% for Hamilton, were for cast 
iron pipes.  
c) Pipe segments less than 200 m in length were found to be prone to failures. 
d) Pipe failures were encountered frequently in clay soil and sand soil (6 soil 
types for City of Hamilton- 7 soil types for City of London).  
Observation 2: Close to 20% of the failures encountered in road assets were 
attributed to deteriorated water or sewer assets. 
Observation 3: Response time to disruptions due to structural or functional 
failures of water, sewer and road assets is a critical indicator for city officials and policy 
makers. Based on infraguide best practices and operation guidelines, the response time 
should be less than 4 hours (SOI, 2005). 
Observation 4: City officials are sensitive to the type of customer who will be 
affected by any disruption. They are less keen to encounter failures in any of the three 
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assets for commercial and/or industrial customers due to high economic costs and 
consequences. 
Observation 5: Most of the reported failures in road networks were reported for 
local, collector and arterial roads with less failures reported for freeway, expressway and 
sidewalks (SOI, 2013).  
Observation 6: The two datasets had similar practices in storing their collected 
data for asset management. Physical and functional factors were stored in one separate 
table and the same was true for operation and maintenance reports if available. This will 
facilitate the development of the proposed models in Chapter 4 as no special 
modifications are needed in implementing such models for each city. 
Such observations suggest: 
 Vulnerability of water and sewer assets is a function of spatial factors; pipe 
condition, neighboring asset condition, soil condition, pipe length, buried depth 
and pipe diameter and functional factors; number of affected customers, 
customers’ type and response time. 
 Vulnerability of road assets is function of spatial factors; road condition, 
neighboring asset condition, soil condition, pipe length, neighboring pipe buried 
depth, pipe diameter and functional factors; average daily traffic, road type and 
response time. 
The betweenness centrality will be added later to the functional factors and the 
justification for this will be explained in next chapter. 
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3.6 Summary and Conclusion 
Two datasets from Cities of London and Hamilton were analyzed along with operation 
and maintenance reports. By analysing the configuration of the two datasets, it was 
found that the two cities had similar practices for data structure and storage where 
physical and functional factors were stored in one table separated from operation and 
maintenance reports. Operation and maintenance reports were used to determine which 
factors are influencing the vulnerability of water, sewer and road assets. Common 
observations found among the two case studies were summarized as well. Based on the 
literature and by examining operation and maintenance reports, 10 factors were 
identified for assessing vulnerability of water, sewer and road assets; 6 for spatial and 4 
for functional. In the next chapter, three computational models will be developed to 







Chapter 4 : DEVELOPED RESEARCH 
FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes three models developed for optimizing intervention 
policies for likely vulnerable civil infrastructure networks considering their spatial and 
functional interdependencies. The first model is the interdependency model which 
consists of two modules; spatial module and functional module. The first identifies 
which assets are spatially interdependent using ArcGIS geoprocessing tools. The 
second identifies asset’s degree of connectivity with its neighbouring assets using 
betweenness centrality. The developed functional module will aid in recognizing the 
likely influence of an asset failure on its neighbouring assets’ performance. The output 
of the assessment model is in the form of bundles of spatially and functionally 
interdependent assets. 
For vulnerability assessment, three computational models are developed to rate 
vulnerability of civil infrastructure systems considering their spatial and functional 
interdependencies with neighboring assets. These models are; 1) multi-attribute utility 
theory (MAUT), 2) artificial neural network (ANN) and 3) fuzzy c-mean clustering 
(FCM). For the MAUT model and based on the identified factors from operation and 
maintenance reports, surveys were sent to 65 experts and their feedback was elicited to 
construct utility functions to rate the degree of vulnerability of interdependent assets. 
The response rate of the survey was 75%. On the other hand, the developed ANN model 
utilizes self-organized mapping algorithm (SOM) to rate vulnerability of these assets 
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based on recognized patterns in each dataset. The developed ANN model is utilized 
because it can rate vulnerability of interdependent assets based on observed patterns in 
each dataset and hence less involvement is required from experts. The third 
computational model is FCM which is capable of accounting for ambiguity associated 
with experts’ judgement in rating vulnerability of interdependent assets. In the FCM 
model, each dataset can belong to more than one rating, and each element of the dataset 
is associated with a set of membership grades. The FCM model is an iterative process 
for assigning these membership grades and then using them to assign data elements to 
one or more vulnerability ratings.   
Finally, the SD model is developed to help identify possible least cost 
intervention policies for interdependent infrastructure assets that meet customers' 
expectations and decrease assets’ vulnerability. The developed SD consists of 23 
variables and 8 causal feedback loops which were extracted and constructed based on 
literature review and four unstructured interviews with experts in the domain of 
municipal asset management from Cities of London and Hamilton, Ontario. At the 
bundle level, the SD model is supplemented with dynamic programing algorithm for 
finding and ranking the available intervention policies. At the network level, the SD is 
supplemented with a genetic algorithm to find a near optimal policy considering the 
ranked policies identified by the dynamic programming algorithm. The single objective 
genetic algorithm (SOGA) is modified by; 1) integrating a query based filtering function 
into the SOGA to cluster similar bundles, 2) adding dynamic memory to store worst 
solutions to prevent the regeneration of such solutions in next iterations and 3) 
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modifying the behavior of the mutation function to improve the convergence rate of the 
genetic algorithm. Summary of the topics covered in this chapter is shown in Figure 4-1. 
 
Figure 4-1 Chapter 4 overview 
4.2 Interdependency Assessment Model 
This model consists of: 1) spatial module, and 2 functional module. The following 
subsections describes the development made in each module.  The spatial module is 
developed to construct bundles of spatially interdependent assets by utilizing ArcGIS 
geoprocessing tools. The second identify asset’s connectivity with its network and 
hence understand to what extent it can compromise the performance of their 
respective networks. The functional module is utilizing betweenness centrality to 























4.2.1 Spatial Module  
The spatial interdependency model is developed to encapsulate assets that are 
spatially interdependent, co-located in the XYZ planes, using ArcGIS geoprocessing 
toolbox. ArcGIS is a geographic information system for visualization, analysis and 
reporting of spatial information using a set of toolboxes called geoprocessing. 
Geoprocessing is a methodical execution of a sequence of operations on geographic data 
to create new information using automated spatial analysis. For infrastructure networks, 
the assets are represented by a feature class where each feature has a geometric profile, 
which inherits its attributes from the main object. For example, the water network is 
represented by connected lines with their geographical location. Also, each water asset 
has attributes such as condition, age, material and diameter...etc. These attributes are 
inherited from the main water object and are adjusted to reflect the characteristics of 
each individual water asset and such attributes are stored in a geographic database for 
further visualization, analysis and reporting inside ArcGIS. 
The geoprocessing toolbox is utilized to take two different datasets (i.e. water 
and road) and find a new single dataset with neighboring assets and their corresponding 
attributes. The spatial module starts by attribute selection queries to select the targeted 
zones of water, sewer and road assets. By using attribute selection queries, the decision 
maker can choose between: 
1) Performing the spatial analysis on specific zones from the targeted networks. 
For example, the decision maker could be interested only in finding bundles 
of interdependent assets in a neighborhood or a suburb or a subnetworks to 
optimize intervention polices for such zone only.  
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2)  Performing the spatial analysis on assets with specific attributes from the 
targeted networks. For example, the decision maker could be interested in 
rating vulnerability for water pipes with a diameter less 150mm. 
3) Performing the spatial analysis on the entire network.   
After the attribute selection queries, a buffer is generated around the study zone. 
A buffer is dynamic or static geometric boundary around the selected feature and it 
encapsulates the study zone. If there is another feature falling within that boundary, it 
will be interdependent with that feature. The width of buffers is designed to vary 
dynamically to account for the asset width (i.e. road width, water or sewer diameter) or 
to be static; based on the decision maker's preferences. The length of buffers can be 
assigned based on length of assets segment (i.e. from one valve to another, from one 
manhole to another, from one intersection to another) or the decision maker's 
preferences. Subsequently, a selection query using location attributes is utilized to select 
the intersected layers of water, sewer and roads. Next, the union module of the 
geoprocessing toolbox is deployed to build four new layers of spatially interdependent 
assets (water and sewers, roads and sewers, roads and water and road, sewer and water 
assets). The developed spatial interdependency algorithm is shown in Figure 4-2. The 
output is new layers with new datasets that contain characteristics of intersected assets 
as shown in Figure 4-3.  
In Figure 4-3, the entity relationship for the spatial module is shown for 
interdependent water and road assets. The water feature class is designed to have 14 
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These attributes are stored in a table inside the geodatabase called feature 
attribute table. There are seven entities with five relationships as shown in Figure 4-3. 
For example, any feature class (asset) can have only one geographic location and 
therefore each feature attribute table is connected to one geographic table and such 
relationship is said to be one to one (1 to 1) as shown in Figure 4-3. The same design is 
maintained for the buffer table as each asset has only one corresponding buffer (1 to 1).  
However, any feature class (asset) can intersect with more than one feature class, 
therefore the relationship between any two feature attribute tables is designed to be one 
to many ( 1 to N). In the entity relationship diagram, any two tables are related through 
one primary key which is the asset ID as shown in Figure 4-3.  
Using the geoprocessing operation shown in Figure 4-2, a number of new fields are 
added to the geodatabase in a separate table called interdependent assets table. In that 
table, new fields are added to represent the characteristics of spatially interdependent 
assets. For example in case roads and sewers are intersected, the soil type between them, 
the distance between these two assets are housed in these new fields. The data housed 
in these new fields is used as input for the vulnerability model to assess the extent of any 
asset failure on the performance of spatially interdependent assets.  
4.2.2 Functional Interdependency model 
After determining the spatial interdependent group of assets, the decision maker 
needs to understand how well each asset is connected to its network and hence judge its 
expected contribution in reducing the nearby assets functionality in case of unforeseen 
events or as a consequence of planned interventions.  To do so, graph theory principles 
are used to understand the connectivity of each asset through a number of metrics. 
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Accordingly, networks are represented throughout vertices and edges G (V, E) and the 
flow between any two vertices is represented by the edges. 
Consider for instance Figure 4-4-a, it depicts a small road network with seven 
vertices (road assets) and eight edges between them to represent the average daily traffic 
flow. The failure effects for a vertex that is connected with large number of vertices are 
likely higher than that of a vertex connected with a small number of vertices. Hence, the 
degree of vertex can measure the number entering or exiting edges, connected vertexes, 






 ................................................................Equation 4-1 
Where deg(Vi) is the degree of a vertex, Ein number of entering edges and Eout is 
number of exiting edges.  
In asset management context, decision makers are interested in capturing which 
assets can significantly damage the network performance more by their structural or 
functional failure. In Figure 4-4-a, two nodes C and D have different scores for degree 
of vertex, 2 and 3 respectively. Based on such metric, C is more important than D as any 
failure in node C will affect three other roads but D will affect two roads only. To show 
the inconsistency in considering such a metric, the shortest path between any two 
vertexes needs to be introduced. The shortest path between nodes i and j (gij) is a path 
allowing users to travel from node i to j using the minimum number of edges. Based on 
the shortest path, users cannot travel from one side to the other side of the network 




















  a) Degree of vertex   b) Normalized degree of vertex 
Figure 4-4 Normalized and non-normalized degree of a vertex  
Betweenness centrality reflects which vertices are the most influential in the 
network and hence it reflects which ones control the flow in the network. Betweenness 
centrality accounts for how many pairs of vertices (i,j) will have vertex k as a node on 
their shortest path. Hence, the betweenness centrality for a vertex can be determined by 









Where gij(k) is number of shortest paths between ij with vertex k, gij is the number of 
shortest paths between i and j.        






kbet ...................................................................Equation 4-3  
Where N is the number of vertexes in the network 
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In this normalized score, the betweenness centrality is normalized by the number 
of possible pairs between node k and all network nodes. This normalized score was 
presented for studying social or information networks where it is possible for a vertex 
to be connected to every other vertex in the network (Newman, 2003). In asset 
management context, it is not rational to make such assumption and therefore the 
normalized betweenness centrality is modified to be the relative ratio between the 





kbet .........................................................................................Equation 4-4  
Where max(bet) is the maximum betweenness score in the network 
The relative betweenness centrality will reflect the vertex relative importance 
compared to the most influential vertex in the network and hence understand its likely 
effect on the network's functionality. Figure 4-5 shows the developed functional module 
algorithm. In this algorithm, the decision maker starts by importing the geometric layout 
of the network from ArcGIS format (mxd) to a format called, GML, geography markup 
language format as shown in Figure 4-5.  
The geography markup language format (GML) is the XML grammar defined 
by the open geospatial consortium (OGC) to express geographical features. The GML 
files of GIS maps serves as a modeling language for geographic systems as well as an 
open interchange format for geographic maps; vector maps or raster maps. After 
converting the geometric layout from mxd format to GML format, the algorithm starts 
by building up the edges and vertices lists needed for calculating the betweenness 
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centrality. After calculating the betweenness centrality for targeted assets, results can be 
exported into the ArcGIS geodatabase or to a new excel sheet. 
 
Figure 4-5 The developed functional module algorithm 
N=|v|
For each vi,vj in G(V,E)















Covert ArcGIS map to GML format
Select Vertices for analysis 
Export Results to Geodatabase or Excel Files 
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4.3 Vulnerability Models 
As mentioned before, Vulnerability is defined in this research as the degree of 
susceptibility to structural or functional failures as a result of being interdependent with 
neighboring assets. Hence, there are two types of vulnerabilities: 1) spatial vulnerability 
and 2) functional vulnerability. Based on the literature and by examining operation and 
maintenance reports, 10 factors were identified for assessing vulnerability of water 
sewer and road assets; 6 for spatial and 4 for functional. An overview of the vulnerability 
model is shown in Figure 4-6. Three computational techniques are developed for 
modeling vulnerability among interdependent assets: 
1) MAUT: This model relies extensively on experts’ judgment in assessing 
vulnerability of interdependent assets. Experts are asked to assign relative 
weights for each factor of the ten identified factors. For each asset type, experts 
are subsequently asked to establish utility functions for vulnerability rating. For 
example, experts are asked to establish the utility functions to rate vulnerability 
of a road asset given that the interdependent asset is water and repeat the same 
procedures if the interdepended asset is sewer.  
2) ANN: Unlike the MAUT model, the ANN model doesn’t require extensive 
feedback from experts with various backgrounds to establish a vulnerability 
assessment model. Instead, this technique utilizes recognized patterns in each 
dataset to assess vulnerability of interdependent assets. The ANN model utilizes 
a self-organizing map algorithm (SOM) to produce a two-dimensional 
discretized representation of the input space called a map. In this map, each asset 
is clustered (rated) based on the ten identified factors.  
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3) FCM: This model is similar to the ANN model as it utilizes recognized patterns 
in each dataset to establish membership functions for each of the identified 
factors. The FCM model is capable of accounting for ambiguity associated with 
experts’ judgement in rating vulnerability of interdependent assets.      
The following subsections illustrate the three developed computational 
techniques and how each model is assessing vulnerability of interdependent assets using 
the identified factors from Chapter 3.  
4.3.1 MAUT  
This model utilizes experts’ judgment to construct utility functions for rating 
vulnerability of interdependent assets. The MAUT is well documented in the literature 
(Torrance et al, 1985; Moselhi and Martinalli, 1994; Ishizaka and Nemery 2013). The 
relative weight for each factor is assigned using expert’s judgment. Surveys were sent 
to experts in the domain of municipal asset management of water, sewer and road 
networks. 
The number of surveys was 65 with a response rate of 75%. The responses were 
elicited from asset officials (10%), operators (30%) and consultants (60%) within USA 
and Canada. The experts’ judgment was elicited and used to construct utility functions 
for rating vulnerability of interdependent assets inside Excel environment and automated 
using VBA. In these surveys, experts were asked to; 1) assign relative weights for the 
spatial and functional vulnerability factors for water, sewer and road assets, 2) construct 
utility functions for each factor. Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8 show the elicited weights for 
spatial and functional factors to rate vulnerability of water and sewer assets 
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Figure 4-6 Vulnerability model overview 
By examining Figure 4-7, pipe condition, neighbouring asset condition and soil 
condition were the most critical factors in rating spatial vulnerability for water and sewer 
assets. On the hand, the number and type of customers were the most critical factors in 
rating functional vulnerability for water and sewer assets as shown in Figure 4-8. 




















Figure 4-7 Weights of spatial factors (water and sewer assets) 
 
Figure 4-8 Weights of functional factors (water and sewer assets) 
Figure 4-9 and Figure 4-10 show the elicited weights for spatial and functional 
factors of road assets. For spatial vulnerability, the most critical factors were road 
condition, neighbouring asset condition and soil condition. Average daily traffic, road 
type and response time were the most critical factors for functional vulnerability. By 
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examining Figures 4-7, 4-8, 4-9 and 4-10, Canadian and USA experts had similar views 
on assigning weights for spatial and functional factors.   
 
Figure 4-9 Weights of spatial factors (road assets) 
 
Figure 4-10 Weights of functional factors (road assets) 
To construct a utility function, the highest and lowest values should be first 
identified and assigned arbitrary values 0 and 1, respectively. Three intermediate values 
are determined using experts' knowledge. The hypothetical scenarios are identified and 
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then the experts were asked to rate their satisfaction over a range of achievement levels 
on each factor. The developed utility functions are shown in Appendix B. The overall 








* ................................................................................................Equation 4-5 
Where Wj is the weight assigned to factor j, Uij is the utility score for the j
th factor 
associated with the ith asset. 
4.3.2 ANN  
Self-organizing map (SOM) is a type of ANN that is trained using unsupervised 
learning to produce a two-dimensional discretized representation of the input space 
called a map (Andrieu et al., 2003). SOMs are different from other ANNs in the sense 
that they use a neighborhood function to preserve the topological properties of the input 
space (Bishhop, 2006). SOM consists of components called neurons and associated with 
each neuron are a weight vector of the same dimension as the input data vectors, and a 
position in the map space. The usual arrangement of nodes is a two-dimensional regular 
spacing in a hexagonal or rectangular grid. The generated self-organizing map describes 
a mapping from a higher-dimensional input space to a lower-dimensional map space. 
The procedure for placing a vector from data space onto the map is to find the node with 
the closest (smallest distance metric) weight vector to the data space vector.  The 
developed ANN algorithm is shown in Figure 4-11 and it can be summarized into 5 
steps: 
1. Randomize the map's nodes weight vectors. 
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2. Select an input vector D(t). 
3. Traverse each node in the map 
a) Use the Euclidean distance to find the similarity between the input vector 
and the selected node’s weight vector. 
b) Track the node that produces the smallest distance; this node is the best 
matching unit (BMU). 
4. Update the nodes in the neighborhood of the BMU (including the BMU itself) 
by pulling them closer to the input vector. 
Wv(s + 1) = Wv(s) + Θ(u, v, s) α(s)(D(t) - Wv(s))…………………Equation 4-6 
5. Increase s and repeat from step 2 while S < λ 
Where S is the current iteration, λ is the iteration limit, t is the index of the target 
input data vector in the input data set D, D(t) is a target input data vector, v is the index 
of the node in the map, Wv is the current weight vector of node v, u is the index of the 
best matching unit (BMU) in the map, Θ(u, v, s) is a restraint due to distance from BMU, 
usually called the neighborhood function, and   is a learning restraint due to iteration 
progress. 
4.3.3 FCM  
Fuzzy c-means (FCM) is a data clustering technique where each data point 
belongs to a cluster with some degree that is specified by a membership grade (Zhu et 
al., 2005). This technique was originally introduced by Jim Bezdek in 1981 as an 




Figure 4-11 The developed ANN algorithm 
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It provides a method that shows how to group data points that populate some 
multidimensional space into a specific number of different clusters. More details about 
the FCM implementation can be found in (Bezdek., 1981; Zhu et al., 2005 and Nock, 
2006).   
The FCM model starts with an initial guess for cluster centers, which are 
intended to mark the mean location of each cluster. The initial guess for these centers is 
most likely incorrect. Additionally, the FCM model assigns every dataset a membership 
grade for each cluster. By iteratively updating the cluster centers and the membership 
grades for each data point, FCM iteratively moves the cluster centers to the right location 
within a data set (Nock, 2006 and MATLAB, 2013). This iteration is based on 
minimizing an objective function that represents the distance from any given data point 
to a cluster center weighted by that data point's membership grade. The algorithm steps 
are shown in Figure 4-12. These steps can be summarized as following: 
1. Select the number of clusters. 
2. Assign randomly to each point coefficients for being in the clusters. 
3. Repeat until the algorithm has converged (that is, the coefficients' change 
between two iterations is no more than the given sensitivity threshold): 























Figure 4-12 The developed FCM algorithm 
Define FCM Inputs
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4.4 System Dynamics Model 
4.4.1 System Dynamics 
SD is a modeling approach to understand strategic problems in complex dynamic 
systems using feedback loops and stocks flow (Sterman, 2000). The SD is utilized in 
this research because of its modeling elements; feedback loops and stocks flow. These 
feedback loops and stocks flow can capture some system dynamics that cannot be 
modeled by discrete event simulation or agent based modeling. Discrete event 
simulation is an event driven simulation paradigm focusing on modeling certain 
processes at their operational level. On the other hand, agent based modeling is focusing 
on modeling behavioral characteristics to gain some explanatory insights into the 
collective behavior of agents obeying set of rules (Macal and North, 2006). The SD is 
useful when:  
1. Systems’ behavior may not be predicted only by behavior of the 
individual parts.  
2. The modeled systems are governed by feedback. 
3.  The systems are nonlinear and history-dependent. 
These characteristics apply to the problem that is being addressed in this 
research. However, SD is a paradigm for understanding systems’ behavior and lacks the 
ability of finding optimal policies to control these systems over time. Therefore, in this 
research system dynamics is augmented with two optimization algorithms to find 
optimal policies at bundle and network level. The following two sections provide an 
overview of SD concepts and its modeling tools to layout the foundation for detailed 
discussion of the developed SD model.  
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4.4.2 Casual Loop Diagrams 
CLDs are an easy to understand diagram that represents the feedback structure 
of a system and they consist of variables and causal links (Sterman 2000). Variables are 
related by the causal links, to determine how dependent variables would change if the 
variables they depend on change. A positive link indicates that the dependent variable 
is directly proportional to the cause, so that when the cause increases (decrease) the 
depending variable increase (decrease) above (below) what would have been. A negative 
link indicates that the dependent variable is inversely proportional to the cause, so that 
when the cause increases (decrease) the depending variable decrease (increase) below 
(above) what would have been. Feedback loop is a loop of interconnected variables, 
such that when a variable of this loop is changed, this change propagates through the 
loop resulting in a change to the originating variable. When the change in the originating 
variable causes a change in other variables that strengthens the original process, the 
feedback loop is termed a reinforcing or positive feedback loop. If the change 
counteracts the original process, the feedback loop is termed a balancing or negative 
feedback loop (Rehan 2011). 
4.4.3 Stock and Flow Diagrams 
CLD are very useful at the beginning of the modeling process, as they can 
capture feedback loops of a system. However, they suffer from the inability of capturing 
the stock and flow behavior of the system’s variables. Stock and flows (SF), along with 
feedback loops are two central concepts of system dynamics (Sterman 2000). Stocks 
represent variables with an accumulating nature, while flows represent the variables that 
cause the accumulations (rates of accumulation). In SFs, stocks are represented by 
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rectangles and flows are represented by arrows. The value of a stock variable is changed 
during simulation only through changes of its flow variables (inflows or outflows). 
Flows can originate or terminate from a stock or a cloud. Clouds represent unlimited 
stocks outside the boundary of the modeled system, such that they never run dry or get 
full. 
4.4.4 Causal Loops 
The causal feedback loops diagram (CLD) has 8 feedback loops as shown in 
Figure 4-13. Causal loops (R1 and R2) were developed based on literature and the 
remaining causal loops were developed based on four unstructured interviews with three 
experts in the domain of municipal asset management; one from the city of London and 
two from the city of Hamilton. While limited number of interviews (i.e. four interviews) 
were conducted to build the SD model, it can be used as a proof of concept on how SD 
can be developed and implemented to find cost effective intervention policies. Six 
feedback loops were constructed based on these interviews. Isaacs (1992) and Sterman 
(2002) presented guidelines for developing CLD using unstructured interviews.  The 
following guidelines were utilized in this research: 
1. Theme Selection: creating CLD is part of a process of articulating deeper 
insights about complex issues the decision maker is interested in 
modeling. Therefore, it is critical to determine what is being targeted by 
SD modeling to establish CLD. The SD model is targeting 
interdependent infrastructure assets modeling and the SD theme is the 
same as the above stated objective.  
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2. Time Horizon: the decision maker should determine an appropriate time 
horizon for the issue being modeled considering the model theme to 
recognize dynamics of the targeted system. In this SD model, the time 
horizon is in years to be capable of evaluating intervention policies at 
tactical and strategic level. 
3. Boundary issue and level of aggregation: during the development of 
CLD, the decision maker should rethink of when to stop adding to CLD.  
The CLD was developed on 4 stages based on the interview sessions referred to above: 
1) Stage one – was planned to explain the basics of SD to participating 
experts. Causal loops such as R1 and R2 shown in Figure 4-13 were used 
for that purpose. R1 only depicts deterioration behavior of an asset and it 
was constructed from Osman et al. (2012) and Wirahadikusumah (2003). 
R2 depicts the effect of intervention action on 1) improving asset’s 
condition and therefore decision maker’s satisfaction from such 
improvement, and 2) increasing lifecycle costs due to intervention. R1 
and R2 were implemented in Anylogic 7 to facilitate experts’ 
understanding of SD basics. 
2) Stage two – was to extract and encapsulate experts’ knowledge in the 
development of R3 to R8 of the developed SD model. Loops R5 and R6 
were developed to depict the relationship between asset’s condition and 
its LOS. Loops R3 and R8 were developed to map the relationship 
between asset’s condition and its vulnerability. The remaining two loops 
(i.e. R4 and R7) were designed to capture the satisfaction of the decision 
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maker based on asset’s condition, LOS and vulnerability for a 
contemplated intervention policy.     
 
Figure 4-13 Casual Loop of the developed SD model 
3) Stage three – was mainly to integrate the developed CLD with their 
related stocks flow diagram. Twenty three variables are divided into; rate 
variables, auxiliary variables and stock variables. The developed SD 












4) Stage four – focused on verification and validation with the experts; after 
building the CLD and integrating it with stocks flow diagram, the SD 
model is applied to two actual case studies and the results of the analyses 
were presented to the experts. The experts are asked to examine the 
results and based on their judgement they can suggest any modifications 
in CLD to obtain more realistic outcomes. Verification and validation of 
the developed SD model are discussed in Chapter 6.             
Causal Loops from 1-4 are described subsequently. The same procedures were 
utilized in the development of the remaining 4 loops.  
The first loop, reinforcing feedback loop R1, represents the typical deterioration 
process of an asset. It includes two variables; 1) the asset deterioration rate, and 2) the 
asset’s condition. The source and purpose for each variable in R1 are shown in Table 4- 
1. The causality of this loop indicates that; 1) as the deterioration rate increases, the asset 
condition index also increases (e.g., on a scale of 1-5, where 5 is the worst condition and 
1 is the best condition), 2) the increase in asset’s condition is accompanied with an 
increase in the deterioration rate (Wirahadikusumah, 2003). The process depicted by this 
loop is captured by the developed algorithm shown in Figure 4-14.  
Table 4-1 Sources and purposes of R1 variables 
Variables Source Purpose 
Asset condition Geodatabase To model asset's 
performance at each time 
step in the SD model Deterioration rate 
Road (Sarja, 2006) - Water 





Figure 4-14 R1 algorithm 
In this loop, the decision maker defines current asset’s condition and its 
deterioration rate. For each time step and if no intervention action is applied, the 
algorithm decreases asset’s condition by using Equation 4-9. Current asset condition is 
calculated using markovian model process (MDP) found in the literature (Scherer and 





For Each Time Step 
Go to R4
Update LCC Equation 4-10












𝑈𝑡 = 𝑈 ∗ 𝑇𝑡…………………….........................................................…….Equation 4-9 
Where U is the current asset’s condition, T is the deterioration matrix and  𝑈𝑡 is asset’s 
condition at time step t 
For example, let’s assume that there is a road asset in a condition state 1 then the 
current condition is represented by a vector U [1 0 0 0 0].  The road asset has the 







0.61 0.39 0 0 0
0 0.74 0.26 0 0
0 0 0.82 0.18 0
0 0 0 0.91 0.09






When using R1 to predict the asset condition for the next 50 years, it will 
generate the following deterioration curve shown in Figure 4-15. If an intervention 
action is applied, the SD model will go to R2 loop. 
 
Figure 4-15 Deterioration curve for the road asset 
Loop number 2, reinforcing feedback loop R2, represents the effect of 


























current condition. It includes four variables; 1) intervention action, 2) asset’s condition, 
3) LCC, and 4) decision maker’s satisfaction from condition. The source and purpose 
for each variable in R2 are shown in Table 4-2 except for asset’s condition which was 
shown in Table 4-1.  The causality of this loop indicates that; if an intervention action is 
taken, the asset’s condition increases, LCC increases as well and decision maker’s 
satisfaction from asset’s condition will increase. The process depicted by this loop is 
captured by the developed algorithm shown in Figure 4-16 .  
Table 4-2 Sources and purposes for R2 variables 
Variables Source Purpose 
Intervention 
actions 
(Hashemi et al, 2008) To improve asset's performance 
Intervention 
actions cost 
(Hashemi et al, 2008) 
To calculate LCC at each time step 




Decision maker (assumed)- 
discussed with the experts 
To measure decision maker’s 
satisfaction for having an asset in a 
certain condition 
 
In this loop, the decision maker defines available intervention actions and their 
associated costs as shown in Table 4-2. The decision maker needs also to define a utility 
function to measure his satisfaction from having an asset in a certain condition. First, 
the decision maker identifies highest and lowest satisfaction points for asset’s condition. 
Three intermediate satisfaction points are defined subsequently. Figure 4-17 shows an 
example of the utility function developed with the experts to represent decision maker’s 
satisfaction from the road condition. In this figure, the target condition in for the road 
assets is 2. If current asset’s condition is equal to this target condition, the decision maker 
will be fully satisfied. If not, the decision maker’s satisfaction will decrease according 




Figure 4-16 R2 algorithm 
 








For Each Time Step











Define Intervention Action Cost
Get Current Asset Condition
Define Utility Function for Decision 






















The SD model is generic by allowing decision makers to define their utility 
functions or use the functions defined by the experts in the unstructured interviews. 
When asset’s condition changes at each time step, the new score for decision maker’s 
satisfaction from current condition is calculated and is sent to Loop R3 to calculate 
decision maker’s total satisfaction from current asset’s condition, its LOS and its 
vulnerability.  
Each intervention action will improve asset’s condition by a certain percentage 
called intervention rate. For example, in Figure 4-18, asset’s condition improves by 
100% each time a replacement action is taken. Each applied intervention action will 
have an associated cost which is added to the current lifecycle cost (LCC) as shown in 
Equation 4-10.  
LCC = I𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + ∫ 𝐿𝐶𝐶 .  𝑑𝑡
𝑡=𝑛
𝑡=0
 ……………………………………………Equation 4-10 
Where Icost is the intervention cost, t is the simulation time and n is the current time 
step  





















The effect of intervention action on the decision maker’s satisfaction based on 
the above deterioration curve is shown in Figure 4-19. In this figure, the decision 
maker’s satisfaction is restored to 100 % when the asset is replaced after 25 years.   
 
Figure 4-19 Effect of the intervention action on the decision maker’s satisfaction from 
to road’s condition  
The third casual feedback loop includes three variables; 1) LCC, 2) decision 
maker’s satisfaction from vulnerability, 3) decision maker’s total satisfaction. The 
causality of this loop indicates that; if the decision’s maker satisfaction from 
vulnerability increases, then decision maker’s total satisfaction increases and LCC also 
increases. The source and purpose of each variable in this loop and next loop as well are 
shown in Table 4-3. An example for the decision maker’s satisfaction from asset’s 




























Table 4-3 Sources and purposes of R3 and R4 variables 
Variables Source Purpose 
Vulnerability 
rating 
From FCM model 
To rationale intervention polices based 
on asset’s vulnerability.   
Level of service 
(LOS) 
Assumed (correlated 
with condition- i.e. 
linear, 
exponential…etc.) 
To rationale intervention polices based 
on asset’s LOS.   




The experts or 
defined by decision 
maker 
To decide the importance of improving 
decision maker’s satisfaction from 
asset’s condition, its LOS and its 
vulnerability 
 




The experts or 
defined by decision 
maker 




The experts or 
defined by decision 
maker  
Total satisfaction Equation 4-11 
To rationale intervention polices based 
on asset’s condition, its LOS and its 
vulnerability. 

























This utility function is established using the same procedure illustrated in R2. 
The algorithm that depicts this process is shown in Figure 4-21. At each time step, the 
algorithm aggregates decision maker’s satisfaction because of current asset’s condition 
(R4), its LOS (R6) and its vulnerability (R8). The algorithm uses Equation 4-11 to 
calculate the decision maker’s total satisfaction. 
Tst = Wc * Cst +WLOS * LOSst + WVL * VLst ………………......……...Equation 4-11 
 
Figure 4-21 R3 algorithm 
Where Tst is the total satisfaction, Wc is the weight for satisfaction from asset’s 




For Each Time Step 
Go to R4
Update LCC Equation 4-10
Go to R6 Go to R8







Get Decision Maker’s 
Satisfaction from LOS
Get Decision Maker’s 
Satisfaction from Condition




for satisfaction from LOS, LOSst is decision maker’s satisfaction for current LOS, WVL 
is the weight for satisfaction from current vulnerability, VLst is decision maker’s 
satisfaction for current vulnerability. 
The fourth casual feedback loop includes three variables; 1) LCC, 2) decision’s maker 
satisfaction from condition, 3) total satisfaction. The causality of the loop indicates that; 
if decision maker’s satisfaction from asset’s condition increases, then decision maker’s 
total satisfaction increases and LCC also increases. The algorithm that depicts this 
process is shown in Figure 4-22.  
 




For Each Time Step 
Go to R4
Update LCC Equation 4-10












At each time step, the algorithm obtains decision maker’s satisfaction for asset’s 
condition (R4). The algorithm then sends this value as an input for R3 to calculate 
decision maker’s total satisfaction using Equation 4-10. R6 and R8 have similar 
structure to R4. Next section explains how the developed CLD was integrated with 
stocks flow diagram and describes as well the mathematical equations used to represent 
CLD. 
4.4.5 Stock and Flow  
The stocks flow diagram combined with the causal feedback loops is shown in 
Figure 4-22. The SD Variables are modeled as stocks if the SD is performing actions 
based on the history of such variables. Five variables were represented as stocks, asset’s 
condition, asset’s LOS, asset’ vulnerability total satisfaction, and LCC, as shown in 
Figure 4-23. The following steps are repeated over the simulation time interval for each 
asset in the bundle: 
1. At each time step, current asset condition is calculated using R1. 
2. The SD model checks if asset’s condition, its LOS and its vulnerability are 
within the target and trigger constrains defined by the decision maker. These 
constrains are defined by the decision maker to evaluate feasibility of each 
policy.   
Lu< U < Tu………………………………….……….………..…….……Equation 4-12 
LLOS< LOS < TLOS….………….……………...……….………….......….Equation 4-13 
LVL< VL < TVL…....…....…....…....…....…....…....…....…....…....….......Equation 4-14 
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Figure 4-23 Stock flow with causal feedback loops 
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Where Lu is the trigger asset condition, Tu is the target asset condition, LLOS is the 
trigger LOS, TLOS is the target LOS, LVL is the trigger vulnerability, TVL is the target 
vulnerability 
3. It should be noted that the vulnerability model is embedded as an object inside 
the SD model to facilitate computing of asset’s vulnerability due to changes 
occurred by other SD variables at each time step. Also, LOS is assumed to be 
correlated (i.e. linearly, exponentially …etc.) with asset’s condition due to lack 
of historical records that can be used for depicting such relationship. 
4. The SD model applies available intervention actions at each time step to 
improve asset’s condition, LOS and vulnerability. Each applied action will 
cause an associated satisfaction gain to the decision maker based on current 
asset’s condition, its LOS and its vulnerability. The decision maker’s total 
satisfaction at each time step is calculated using loops R2 to R8. 
5. Each applied intervention action will have an associated cost which is added to 
the current lifecycle cost (LCC) using Equation 4-10.  
4.4.6 Dynamic Programming Algorithm  
In the developed SD model, decisions are taken recursively over several points 
in time. Dynamic programming is suitable for such optimization problems (Hiller and 
Lieberman, 2005; Taha, 2005). In dynamic programming, the optimization problem is 
simplified by breaking it down into simpler subproblems which can be solved in a 
recursive manner. Detailed discussion about dynamic programming can be found in 
(Hieler and Lieberman, 2005; Taha, 2005). The dynamic programming algorithm is 
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integrated with SD to; 1) find and rank the best n solution and present these solutions to 
the decision maker in excel report, 2) use the ranked n solutions to seed the initial 
population of the SOGA. 
The developed dynamic programming algorithm is shown in Figure 4-24. At the 
bundle level, the main objective is to maximize decision maker’s total satisfaction 
gained from interdependent assets at each time step as shown in Equation 4-15. The 
decision variable in this algorithm is the combination of intervention actions to be 
selected at each time step to maximize Equation 4-15. Constrains are shown previously 
in Equations 4-12, 4-13 and 4-14.  
Vi(Ts) =  max (∑(Ts(w)+ Ts(s)+ Ts(r))) …………………….…..………..Equation 4-15 
Where Vi(Ts) is decision maker’s total satisfaction due to certain combination 
of intervention actions at time step n for water, sewer and road assets and Ts(w,s,r) is 
the decision maker’s total satisfaction for water, sewer and road assets.  
Decision maker’s total satisfaction from each asset is obtained using Equation 4-
10 as shown in previous section. The optimization is performed by defining a sequence 
of value functions V1, V2, ..., Vn, with an argument y representing the state of the 
system at each time step. These value functions represent decision maker’s total 
satisfaction obtained from interdependent assets in each bundle. Using backward 
calculations, these value functions (Vi) at earlier time steps (i = n −1, n –2 ..... 2, 1) are 
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Figure 4-25 Sample of the dynamic programming network 
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The algorithm evaluates all possible combinations of intervention actions for 
each bundle to maximize Equation 4-15 within the SD model constrains (Equations 4-
12, 4-13 and 4-14) as shown in Figure 4-25. The algorithm selects combination of 
intervention actions that maximizes Equation 4-15 in this step and previous step as well. 
The same steps are repeated from time step i=n to i=1. The algorithm repeats the same 
procedures but using forward calculations to check for consistency of obtained solutions. 
Finally, the dynamic programming algorithm generates the best n policies for each 
bundle in excel report. The inputs and the outputs of this model are shown in Tables 5-
2 and 5-3 in Chapter 5. 
4.4.7 Single Objective Optimization Algorithm 
SOGA is an evolutionary process for improving characteristics of the off-springs 
based on the characteristics of their parents (Goldberg 1989). Interdependent 
infrastructure systems are considered as large scale systems that require near optimal 
solutions satisfying decision makers’ objectives in reasonable computational time. 
Hence, non-exact methods prevail when the objective is to find near optimal solutions 
over large space of water, sewer and road assets. The literature review covered four non-
exact algorithms like tabu search, local search strategy, simulated annealing and genetic 
algorithms.  SOGA seems suitable as an optimization technique over other non-exact 
algorithms covered in Chapter 2 (Talbi, 2009; Taha,2008; Hillier and Lieberman, 2004). 
It allows for exploration of wide search space in timely fashion and utilizes genetic 
operators to improve characteristics of search space (Talbi, 2009). Three modifications 
are introduced to SOGA to suite the SD model;  1) integrating a query based filtering 
function into the SOGA to cluster similar bundles, 2) adding dynamic memory to store 
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worst solutions to prevent regenerating such solutions in next iterations and 3) 
modifying the behavior of the mutation function to improve convergence rate of the 
SOGA. 
In SOGA algorithm, each chromosome represents a solution containing a set of 
possible intervention policies for bundles at the network level as shown in   
Figure 4-26. Each gene in the chromosome represents an intervention policy for 
a certain bundle and each policy contains set of intervention actions taken at each time 
step for that bundle. The policy inside each gene is selected randomly for the best n 
ranked alternatives computed by the SD and dynamic programming algorithm.  The 
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Figure 4-26 Chromosome structure 
The objective of this algorithm is to maximize the decision maker’s satisfaction 
from each bundle at network level by applying a set of intervention policies.  
Z = max (∑ni (∑(Ts(w)+ Ts(s)+ Ts(r))) ……………..……………….…..Equation 4-16 
Where Z is the objective and n is the ith bundle  
Reproducing a new population is performed by utilizing crossover and mutation 
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This optimization algorithm has the same constrains shown in Equations 4-12, 
4-13 and 4-14. The algorithm is also constrained by finding a near optimum policy for 
analyzed bundles within budget constraints. 
Ballocated < Bassigned ……………………………………………………..…..Equation 4-17 
Where Ballocated is available budget and Bassigned is assigned budget  
The single objective genetic algorithm is enhanced by: 
1. Integrating a query based filtering function into the SOGA. The filter function 
will use query language of the database management systems (DBMSs) to 
cluster similar bundles. For example, several bundles may have the same assets’ 
characteristics; condition, LOS, vulnerability. To facilitate the SOGA analysis, 
only one of these similar bundles will be considered in building the SOGA 
chromosomes.   
2. Adding a dynamic memory that stores worst solutions. This will insure that such 
solutions will not be regenerated in subsequent trials of the SOGA and hence 
increase the fitness of future generations. The memory is dynamic because it is 
updated at each trial of the SOGA with worst solutions. 
3. Changing behavior of the mutation function in the SOGA. In traditional genetic 
algorithm, the mutation function improves chromosome’s fitness by randomly 
changing only one of its genes. The modified mutation function will perform 
the following: 
a) One of the chromosome’s genes will be randomly selected. 
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b) The algorithm will check if by changing the selected gene, the new 
chromosome’s fitness does improve. If not, a new gene is selected and 
procedures a and b are repeated again. 
c) The algorithm will repeat step a and b until no further improvement can 
be obtained for this selected chromosome or the solution become 
infeasible.  
d) The decision maker can define a threshold for the number of iterations 
used in the mutation function in order to improve chromosome’s fitness. 
This will help in preventing infinite loops.    
4.5 Summary and Conclusion  
In this chapter, three developed models were described for optimizing 
intervention policies for likely vulnerable civil infrastructure networks considering their 
spatial and functional interdependencies. The first model was the interdependency 
model which consists of two modules; spatial module and functional module. The first 
identifies which assets are spatially interdependent using ArcGIS geoprocessing tools. 
The second identifies asset’s connectivity with its network and hence understand 
to what extent it can compromise the performance of their respective networks. 
The vulnerability model consists of three computational models; 1) MAUT, 2) ANN and 
3) FCM. MAUT: The MAUT model relies extensively on experts’ judgment in assessing 
vulnerability of interdependent assets. Unlike the MAUT model, the ANN model 
doesn’t require extensive feedback from experts to establish a vulnerability assessment 
model. Instead, the ANN model utilizes the recognized patterns in each dataset to assess 
vulnerability of interdependent assets. On the other hand, the FCM model accounts for 
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ambiguity that arises due experts’ judgement in rating vulnerability of interdependent 
assets. Finally, the SD model was presented to allocate intervention actions at both 
bundle and network levels. The developed SD consists of 23 variables and 8 causal 
feedback loops which were extracted and constructed based on extensive literature 
review and four unstructured interviews with official members from City of London. At 
the bundle level, the SD model is supplemented with dynamic programing algorithm for 
finding and ranking best n intervention policies. At the network level, the SD is 
supplemented with genetic algorithm to find and rank the best m near optimal 
intervention policies. The SOGA considers the n ranked policies identified by the 
dynamic programming algorithm to seed its initial population. The single objective 
genetic algorithm is modified by; 1) integrating a query based filtering function into the 
SOGA to cluster similar bundles, 2) adding dynamic memory to store worst solutions to 
prevent the regeneration of such solutions in next iterations and 3) modifying the 










Chapter 5 : COMPUTER IMPLEMENTATION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the computer implementation of the developed models, 
along with their inputs and outputs as well as the graphical user interface (GUI) for each 
model. The end user interaction with the developed models is described as well. 
Figure 5-1 depicts an overview of Chapter 5.  
 
Figure 5-1 Chapter 5 overview 
5.2 Interdependency Assessment Model 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the interdependency assessment model consists of: 
1) spatial module, and 2 )  functional module. These two modules were implemented 
using python programming language and were embedded inside the ArcGIS 
environment. These modules were embedded inside the ArcGIS environment to; 1) 
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facilitate importing of required inputs from the ArcGIS geodatabase and 2) facilitate 
exporting of their outputs into the ArcGIS geodatabase. The interactions between the 
end user and the two developed modules is shown in Figure 5-2.  
 
Figure 5-2 Interactions between the end user and the two implemented modules 
5.2.1 Spatial Module 
The spatial module has three inputs; geodatabases of infrastructure networks, 
buffer length and buffer width. The output of this module is in the form of bundles of 
spatially interdependent assets. These bundles are exported in two formats; new ArcGIS 
layers and new geodatabase table to host factors needed for vulnerability analysis of 
interdependent assets. The developed algorithm for this module was shown in Figure 4-
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2. The user interface for this module is shown in Figures (5-4, 5-5, 5-6 and 5-7). In this 
module, the user performs the following operations: 
1- The user starts by double clicking on the developed spatial module from the 
available ArcGIS toolboxes as shown in Figure 5-3. 
2- The user form shown in Figure 5-4 will pop up. For example, the user starts 
by selecting the files of road and water networks for performing the spatial 
analysis. By double clicking on the road network icon, blue oval, shown in 
Figure 5-4, another user form will pop up to select the road network from 
the disk drive as shown in Figure 5-5. After selecting the road network’s 
file, the network is imported into the module and then the user repeats the 
same steps for the water network. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the module is 
flexible enough to allow the user to import; 1) specific zones from targeted 
networks or 2) assets with specific attributes from targeted networks or 3) 
the entire infrastructure network.  
3- The user then selects the buffer’s length and width around each asset type. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, a buffer is dynamic or static geometric boundary 
around the selected asset and it encapsulates the study zone. If there is 
another asset falling within that boundary, it will be interdependent with that 
asset. 
4- The module then utilizes intersection and union operations of ArcGIS to 
overlay the selected networks and encapsulate the interdependent assets in 
a new layer as shown in Figure 5-6.  
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5- The new geodatabase table of interdependent assets is exported into the 
ArcGIS geodatabase. This new geodatabase table will include factors 
needed for assessing vulnerability of interdependent assets. Figure 5-7 
shows the developed entity relationship diagram for the new geodatabase 
table for water, sewer and road assets. The entities, their attributes and 
relationships were discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
Figure 5-3 Spatial module and ArcGIS toolboxes 
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5.2.2 Functional Module 
This module was embedded inside the ArcGIS environment and written using 
python programming language. The module utilizes an open source python library called 
“igraph” that has a collection of network analysis functions suitable for performing the 
operations described in the developed algorithm shown in Figure 4-5. The input for this 
module is the geometric layout of each infrastructure network. The output of this module 
is the calculated betweenness centrality for each asset in the infrastructure network. The 
user performs the following operations: 
1- The user starts by importing the geometric layout of each infrastructure 
network from ArcGIS format (mxd) to a format called, GML, geography 
markup language format as shown in Figure 5-8. The geography markup 
language format (GML) is the XML grammar defined by the open geospatial 
consortium (OGC) to express geographical features. GML serves as a 
modeling language for geographic systems as well as an open interchange 
format for geographic maps; vector maps or raster maps.  
2- After converting the geometric layout from mxd format to GML format, the 
algorithm starts by building up the edges and vertices lists needed for 
calculating the betweenness centrality. As mentioned in Chapter 4, assets are 
represented throughout vertices and edges represent the flow between any 
two vertices in the network. In this module, the user can find the betweenness 



















































































































































3- The calculated betweenness centrality for each asset can be exported into the 
ArcGIS geodatabase or to a new excel sheet. The excel output of this module 
is shown in Figure 5-9.  
 
Figure 5-9 Functional module output 
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5.3 Vulnerability Model 
The vulnerability model consists of three developed models to rate vulnerability 
of interdependent assets; 1) MAUT, 2) ANN and 3) FNN. These models were 
implemented outside the ArcGIS environment. The first model was implemented inside 
the excel environment and automated using VBA. The other two models were 
implemented using MATLAB programming language. At first, the three developed 
models were tested to determine the most suitable model based on the available datasets. 
After determining the most suitable model, it will be embedded in the SD model to 
decrease the computational time needed for identifying possible least cost intervention 
policies for vulnerable assets. The vulnerability model utilizes the ten factors identified 
in Chapter 3 to rate vulnerability of interdependent assets.  The interactions between the 
end user and the three implemented models are shown in Figure 5-10. For the MAUT 
model, the user performs the following operations: 
1- The user starts by importing bundles of interdependent assets from the 
ArcGIS geodatabase to the MAUT model. The user starts by selecting the 
location of the ArcGIS geodatabase from the disk drive and then the bundles 
are automatically imported into the excel sheet. 
2- The user needs to define the utility functions for rating vulnerability of 
interdependent assets as shown in Figure 5-11. As shown in Figure 5-11, the 
user can use the default utility functions suggested from the surveys 





Figure 5-10 Interaction between the end user and vulnerability models 
3- There are three ways to assign weights for the utility functions; 1) use the 
suggested weights elicited from the surveys or 2) the user defines these 
weights subjectively or 3) the user utilizes AHP technique integrated inside 
MAUT to assign these weights objectively as shown in Figure 5-12.  
4- The MAUT model will calculate vulnerability ratings for interdependent 
assets as shown in Figure 5-13.  
5- The results can be exported into the ArcGIS geodatabase for further analysis 












Figure 5-13 MAUT output 
For the ANN model, it utilizes the developed self-organized maps algorithm 
shown in Figure 4-11.  As shown in Figure 5-10, the user starts by defining the number 
of clusters, (i.e. vulnerability ratings). The user imports interdependent bundles from the 
ArcGIS geodatabase to MATLAB environment. The ANN model then performs the 
procedures described in Chapter 4 to cluster interdependent assets into the defined 
number of clusters. When the user is satisfied with the mean square error (MSE) for the 
ANN technique, vulnerability ratings are exported from MATLAB to the geodatabase 
of ArcGIS for further analysis and visualization. 
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The developed FCM algorithm shown in Figure 4-12 was implemented using 
MATLAB programming language. The user interaction with this model is similar to 
ANN. The user starts by defining the number of required clusters (i.e. vulnerability 
ratings) as shown in Figure 5-10. The user then imports the bundles of interdependent 
assets from the ArcGIS geodatabase to MATLAB environment.  The implemented 
algorithm performs the six steps shown in Figure 4-12. When the user is satisfied with 
the mean square error for FCM, vulnerability ratings of interdependent assets are 
exported from MATLAB to the ArcGIS geodatabase for further analysis and 
visualization. 
5.4 System Dynamics Model 
The SD model was implemented using C#. The simulation engine for Anylogic 
7 was embedded inside the system dynamic model using C# and was supplemented with 
the two developed optimization algorithms discussed in Chapter 4. The FCM model was 
also embedded inside the SD model to facilitate the calculations needed for rating 
vulnerability of interdependent assets at each time step of the simulation. The 
interactions between the end user and the developed model is shown in Figure 5-14. 
Table 5-1 provides a summary for the required SD variables with their sources and 
purposes. A sample from the GUI used to define SD variables related to the road assets 
is shown in Figure 5-15. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the SD is composed of two tiers; 
tier one for the bundle level is SD and dynamic programming and tier two for the 
network level is SD and genetic algorithm (GA). For the first tier, the needed inputs for 





Figure 5-14 Interaction between the end user and the developed system dynamic model 
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The user starts by importing bundles of interdependent assets from the ArcGIS 
geodatabase into the SD program. The user then defines the inputs shown in Tables 5-1 
and 5-2. The developed algorithm shown in Figure 4-24 is then utilized to find the 
outputs shown in Table 5-3. The main output of this tier is an intervention report that 
contains the best n policies at bundle level. In this intervention report, for each time step 
and for each asset in the bundle; the decision maker can find asset’s condition, its LOS, 
its vulnerability, intervention action, intervention cost, total lifecycle cost and total 
satisfaction as shown in Table 5-3.   
 




Figure 5-16 The SD and dynamic programming output 
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Table 5-1 Summary of SD model vaiables 
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Table 5-2 Dynamic programming algorithm inputs 




To determine the best n policies 





To determine the analysis period of 
the SD and dynamic programming 
 
Table 5-3 SD and dynamic programming algorithm outputs 
Outputs 
Each policy report 
contains 
Intervention report contents 
The best n policies 
at bundle level 
For each time step and 
for each asset in the 
bundle 
Asset condition, LOS and 
vulnerability 
Intervention action at each time step 
Intervention cost at each time step 
Total lifecycle cost 




For the second tier, the SD model is supplemented with GA to find a near optimal 
policy considering the ranked policies identified by the dynamic programming 
algorithm. The required inputs for GA algorithm are shown in Table 5-4. The GUI used 
for defining these inputs is shown in Figure 5-17.  The expected outputs for this tier are 
shown in Table 5-5. 
Table 5-4 GA inputs 
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No of trials 
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To select the optimum intervention 
policies at network level 
n 
SD and dynamic 
programming 





To determine the best m solutions at the 
network level required by the decision 
maker 
 
Table 5-5 SD and GA outputs 
Output Intervention report contents 
The best m solutions at network level 
The best policy for each bundle 
The total cost for that solution 
Total satisfaction for each solution 
Time to reach the optimum solution 






Figure 5-17 GUI for the inputs of the two proposed supplemented algorithms 
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5.5 Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter described the computer implementation of the developed models, 
along with their inputs and outputs as well as the graphical user interface (GUI) for each 
model. The end user interaction with the developed models was described as well. The 
interdependency assessment model were implemented using python programming 
language and were embedded inside the ArcGIS environment. The vulnerability model 
consists of three developed models to rate vulnerability of interdependent assets; 1) 
MAUT, 2) ANN and 3) FNN. These models were implemented outside the ArcGIS 
environment. The first model was implemented inside the excel environment and 
automated using VBA. The other two models were implemented using MATLAB 
programming language. After determining the most suitable model as will be shown in 
next chapter, it will be embedded in the SD model to decrease the computational time 
needed for identifying possible least cost intervention policies for vulnerable assets. The 
SD model was implemented using C#. The simulation engine for Anylogic 7 was 
embedded inside the system dynamic model using C# and was supplemented with the 





Chapter 6 : CASE STUDIES 
6.1  Introduction 
Two case studies are analyzed and used to demonstrate the application of the 
developed research framework as shown in Figure 6-1. The two case studies were 
obtained from the Cities of London and Hamilton, Ontario. The sources used for 
defining the inputs of the SD model were discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. The analysis 
discussed in the following subsections was performed on AMD Quad-core processor 1.9 
GHZ with random access memory of 8 GB and cash memory of 4MB.  
 
Figure 6-1 Chapter overview 
6.2 City of Hamilton 
The data analysed in this section is for the City of Hamilton water distribution 
and road networks. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the City of Hamilton owns 1,950 km of 
Chapter 6















water assets with replacement value of CAD 1.82 billion and 3,000 km of road assets 
with replacement value of CAD 3.25 billion (SOI Report, 2005). The collected datasets 
consists of 43,031 datasets for the water network and 12,350 for the road network. 
6.2.1 Interdependency Assessment Model 
After removing incomplete records, 10,650 datasets for water network and 6000 
datasets for road network were considered for the interdependency assessment model. 
The interdependency model consists of; 1) spatial module and 2) functional module. The 
developed spatial module shown in Figure 4-2 was implemented using python and was 
embedded inside the ArcGIS environment as a new geoprocessing tool. In this case 
study, the analysis started by defining the targeted layers for spatial interdependency 
analysis (i.e. water and road networks). Subsequently, the parameters for buffering 
construction around water and road assets were initialized. The bundle’s length was 
200m and its width was the same as the street segment’s width. Interdependent water 
and road assets are grouped into a new layer called interdependent water and road assets 
layer. The number of bundles constructed by this module was 12,350 bundles. For the 
new interdependent layer of water and road assets, a new geodatabase file was generated 
to include data required for the vulnerability assessment model. The computational time 
for this module was 45.2 sec. 
As mentioned in chapter 4, the developed functional module is utilized to 
calculate the relative betweenness centrality (RBC) and use it as a metric for judging the 
likely influence of an asset failure on its neighboring assets' performance. Figure 6-2 































Figure 6-2 A sample from the road network with asset’s ID 
The developed functional module shown in Figure 4-5 was implemented using 
python and embedded inside ArcGIS. The module starts by importing the targeted 
network of each asset type. The module then starts building vertices and edges lists 
needed for applying the algorithm of the function module. After performing the 
functional module analysis, RBC is imported back into ArcGIS geodatabase of the 
analyzed assets as shown in Table 6-1Table 6-1. The computational time was 10.5 min. 
For the road network sample shown in Figure 6-2, assets with ID (1, 2, and 13) are 
located at the end of the road network so they do not control the flow inside the network 
and therefore their RBC score is zero or close to zero. On the other hand, asset (6) has 
RBC score of one meaning that this asset is vital to network's functionality. Figure 6-3 
shows a comparison between RBC histograms for both assets. The water network is 




Table 6-1 RBC for a sample from the road network, Hamilton 










a) Water Network 
 
b) Road Network 














































6.2.2 Vulnerability Model 
The vulnerability model consists of three developed models; 1) MAUT, 2) ANN 
and 3) FCM. These three models were utilized to analyze the 12,350 bundles of 
interdependent water and road assets. The outputs of MAUT model for these bundles 
are shown in Figure 6-4. As mentioned in Chapter 4, vulnerability is measured on a scale 
from 1 to 10 where 1 is very low vulnerability and 10 is very high vulnerability. This 
scale can be customized by the decision maker to suit his or her preferences as discussed 
in Chapter 5. 
Figure 6-4 Vulnerability rating for City of Hamilton using the MAUT model 
Table 6-2 shows a comparision between the outputs obtained using MAUT and 
the other two models. For the water network, the MSE model was 5.29 for the FCM 
model and 11.22 for the ANN model. For the road network, the MSE model was 11.5 
for the FCM model and 7.21 for the ANN model. Figure 6-5 shows the results of the 
FCM model when being visualized inside ArcGIS environment. 
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Percentages of assets in each vulnerability rating (%) 
 Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Water MAUT 0 0 0 2 20 22 25 30 1 0 
ANN 0 0 0 4 15 18 32 26 5 0 
FCM 0 0 1 1 22 20 24 27 3 2 
Road MAUT 0 0 0 3 15 15 25 40 2 0 
ANN 0 0 3 4 10 20 18 44 1 0 
FCM 0 0 4 5 14 14 22 36 4 1 
 
 





Based on such results, the FCM model had an average MSE of 6.25 for both 
assets and the ANN model had an average MSE of 11.22. The FCM model showed better 
performance than the ANN model in mimicking experts’ judgement.  
6.2.3 System Dynamics Model 
First, the casual loops R1 and R2 of the SD model were verified by using two 
examples from the literature; one for road assets (Sarja, 2006) and one for water assets 
(Osman et al, 2012). The SD model was tested to see if it can replicate results generated 
by Sarja (2006) and Osman et al, (2012). The model was tested also to measure its 
sensitivity under three conditions; 1) no intervention action is applied, 2) intervention 
actions are applied based on thresholds for asset’s condition or its LOS or its 
vulnerability and 3) imposing intervention action on close time intervals. The first two 
conditions were described in Chapter 4 (Figures 4-15 and 4-18). For the third condition, 
Figure 6-6 shows an example for a deterioration curve generated by the SD model for a 
water asset with intervention actions being applied once the asset moves from condition 
state 5 to 4. The SD was capable of replicating results of Sarja (2006) and Osman et al, 
(2012) and it was capable of handling extreme inputs as shown in Figure 6-6.  







The SD model was then applied on the bundle level and the network level. 
Results of this analysis were discussed with the experts and their feedback is included 
in the section of discussion of the research findings. For the bundle level, Table 6-3 
shows the top ten scenarios for bundle number 1 which consists of water asset and road 
asset.  














1 76.1 686250 73.2 343125 
2 77.2 776500 76 388250 
3 78 908850 79.1 454425 
4 80.1 1046250 82.1 523125 
5 82 1083750 82 541875 
6 82.1 1158750 83.6 579375 
7 86.1 1196250 84.1 598125 
8 88.1 1258750 87.7 629375 
9 90.1 1458750 89.1 729375 
10 92.1 1504400 90.1 752200 
The analysis period for these two assets was 30 years. The total number of 
scenarios evaluated for this bundle using dynamic programming algorithm was 90,000 
and these policies were ranked based on Equation 4-15. The computational time was 1.1 
sec. The variance in average satisfaction of the decision maker for the water asset 
between policy 1 and 10 is 21.02 % with cost variance of 119.2 %. This means in order 
to improve the average satisfaction by 21.02 %, investments need to be increased by 
119.2% for this water asset.   
Samples ranging between 100 to 12,350 bundles were selected to be optimized 
at the network level.  These samples were used to test the performance of traditional GA 
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against the modified GA shown in Figure 6-7. The population size was 10000, mutation 
rate was 0.4, crossover rate was 0.6 and number of trials was 1000. For 100 bundles, the 
available budget for water assets was CAD 160,000,000 and CAD 70,000,000 for road 
assets. For traditional GA, the allocated budget for water assets was CAD 179,490,000 
and 98,719,500 CAD for road assets. For the modified GA algorithm, the allocated 
budget for water assets was CAD 150,200,000 and 88,312,200 CAD for road assets. 
These results were obtained using the equations articulated in the GA section in Chapter 
4 (Equations 4-12, 4-13, 4-14 and 4-17). By closely examining the results, the modified 
GA showed slower growth rate in the computational time needed for optimizing 
intervention policies at network level. For the 12,350 bundles, the computational time 
for the modified GA was 51.40 % less than traditional GA.  
 

































A sample for the best solutions obtained at the network level using the modified 
GA is show in Table 6-4. The best solution and its policies are shown in Figure 6-8. The 
assigned budget for the best solution was 543 M for 12,350 bundles. Solution 6 assigns 
better intervention polices for each bundle however the assigned budget exceeds the 
available budget (550 M) by 137 M. Appendix C has more details about the intervention 
actions taken within each policy.  
Table 6-4 Sample for the best solutions obtained at the network level from the modified 
GA algorithm 
Bundle ID 1 47 238 4590 6790 11250 Budget 
Solution 1 Policy 10 Policy 7 Policy 6 Policy 4 Policy 7 Policy 9 543 M 
Solution 2 Policy 7 Policy 4 Policy 4 Policy 2 Policy 8 Policy 6 589 M 
Solution 3 Policy 6 Policy 2 Policy 5 Policy 1 Policy 4 Policy 4 605 M 
Solution 4 Policy 4 Policy 5 Policy 3 Policy 2 Policy 6 Policy 3 625 M 
Solution 5 Policy 7 Policy 3 Policy 1 Policy 3 Policy 4 Policy 2 656 M 
Solution 6 Policy 5 Policy 2 Policy 2 Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 2 687 M 
 
6.3 City of London 
The city of London according to the 2013 SOI report owns; 1) water network of 
1,570 km with total replacement value of $2.7 billion, 2) sewer network of 1,430 km 
with replacement value of 2 billion and 3) road network of 3,717 km with replacement 
cost of 1.8 billion. The collected datasets consists of 9145 datasets for road network, 















6.3.1 Interdependency Assessment 
Only 1895 road datasets, 9000 sewer datasets and 14500 water datasets were 
used after removing incomplete records. The same procedures were applied in this case 
study. For spatial module, the targeted layers for spatial interdependency analysis were 
water, sewer and road assets. The buffer length and width was the same as the first case 
study. The number of bundles constructed by this module was 10,500 bundles. The 
computational time was 39.5 sec. After performing the functional module analysis, RBC 
is imported back into ArcGIS geodatabase of the analyzed assets. The computational 
time for the functional module was 8.7 min.   
Figure 6-9 shows a comparison between the RBC histograms for water, sewer 
and road assets. The water and sewer networks are also skewed to the right and they 
have similar RBC histograms when compared to the water network of the City of 
Hamilton. The road network has also similar histogram when compared to the road 
network of the City of Hamilton. In both cases, road assets had better connectivity than 
water and sewer assets. Figure 6-9 shows a comparison between the RBC histograms 
for water, sewer and road assets. The water and sewer networks are also skewed to the 
right and they have similar RBC histograms when compared to the water network of the 
City of Hamilton. The road network has also similar histogram when compared to the 
road network of the City of Hamilton. In both cases, road assets had better connectivity 









c) Road  


































































6.3.2 Vulnerability Model 
Table 6-5 shows a comparision between the outputs obtained using the MAUT 
model and the other two models (ANN and FCM). For the water network, the MSE was 
13.71 for the FCM model and 11.74 for the ANN model. For the road network, the MSE 
was 18.05 for the FCM model and 8 for the ANN model. For the sewer network, the 
MSE was 34.1 for the FCM model and was 36 for the ANN model. For the City of 
London, the FCM model had an average MSE of 18.24 and the ANN model had an 
avergae MSE of 21.97. Figure 6-10 shows the results of the FCM model for the water 
network when being visulized inside the ArcGIS environment. The FCM model also 
showed better performance than the ANN model in mimicking experts’ judgement in 
this case study. 
Table 6-5 Comparison between the three models for City of London 
Network 
Percentages of assets in each rating (%) 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Water 
MAUT 8 12 10 12 8 4 22 15 9 0 
ANN 12 10 8 9 14 7 17 21 2 0 
FCM 9 11 9 13 7 2 20 25 4 0 
Road 
MAUT 0 0 5 22 10 12 25 20 6 0 
ANN 0 0 4 14 20 22 25 15 0 0 
FCM 0 0 4 18 12 14 22 25 4 1 
Sewer 
MAUT 0 5 7 8 14 25 22 12 7 0 
ANN 0 0 5 14 20 20 15 21 3 2 










The FCM model is also used to construct fuzzy membership functions as shown 
in Figure 6-11. These member functions are constructed based on observed patterns in 
the analyzied datasets. Using the center of gravity deffuzification method, the decision 
maker can use generated memebership functions for each factor to rate vulneability of 
interdependent assets accounting for ambiguity in experts’ input. 
 
Figure 6-11 Vulnerability rating for water asset based on its condition  
6.3.3 System Dynamics Model 
To benchmark the performance of the modified GA against traditional GA, 
samples of bundles ranging from 100 to 10,500 were selected. For each sample of 
bundles, the time to reach the optimal solution was recorded for both GA types. The 
population size was 10,000, mutation rate was 0.4, crossover rate was 0.6 and number 
of trials was 1000. For 10,500 bundles, Figure 6-12 shows that the growth rate for the 
computational time needed to reach the optimal solution by modified GA is less than 
traditional GA by 47.2%.  
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Figure 6-12 Comparison between traditional GA and modified GA 
A sample for the best solutions obtained at the network level using the modified 
GA is show in Table 6-4. The best solution and its policies are shown in Figure 6-13. 
The assigned budget for the best solution was 738 M for 10,500 bundles. Solution 6 
assigns better intervention polices for each bundle however the assigned budget exceeds 
the available budget (740 M) by 155 M. Appendix C has more details about the 
intervention actions taken within each policy.  
Table 6-6 Sample for the best solutions obtained at the network level from the modified 
GA algorithm 
Bundle ID 11 67 568 789 951 8510 Budget 
Solution 1 Policy 9 Policy 7 Policy 10 Policy 3 Policy 8 Policy 9 738 M 
Solution 2 Policy 6 Policy 3 Policy 9 Policy 5 Policy 6 Policy 9 789 M 
Solution 3 Policy 4 Policy 2 Policy 8 Policy 6 Policy 3 Policy 8 815 M 
Solution 4 Policy 2 Policy 5 Policy 7 Policy 7 Policy 5 Policy 5 835 M 
Solution 5 Policy 5 Policy 2 Policy 4 Policy 4 Policy 2 Policy 4 858 M 











































6.4 Discussion of the Research Findings  
The spatial module was capable of constructing bundles of interdependent assets 
in timely fashion; 45.2 sec for the City of Hamilton and 39.5 sec for the City of London. 
For the functional module, results indicate that water and sewer networks have lower 
connectivity when compared to the road network in both cases. The computational time 
for the functional module was 10.5 min for the City of Hamilton and 8.7 min for the 
City of London.  
For the vulnerability model, Table 6-7 shows a comparison between the three 
developed models for vulnerability assessment. Based on available datasets, the FCM 
model is the best technique for mimicking experts’ judgment in rating vulnerably of 
interdependent assets.  
For the MAUT model, it is easy to use and can be modified by other 
municipalities to suit their needs. The MAUT model may seem as favorable option in 
lack of enough historical data to build these data extensive models (ANN and FCM). 
However, the MAUT model suffers from some subjectivity as it considers experts’ input 
for assessing vulnerability of interdependent water, sewer and road assets. The experts’ 
input for constructing utility curves may not reflect all the observed patterns found in 
each dataset. In addition, the MAUT model does not consider ambiguity that exists in 
rating vulnerability of interdependent civil infrastructure assets due to experts’ input. 
The MAUT model also requires extensive feedback from participants in the asset 
management with various backgrounds (operational, strategic and consultant) to 
construct an objective model.    
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Table 6-7 Comparison between the three models 
 MAUT ANN FCM 
Requires historical data No Yes (>=500) Yes (>=500) 
Analysis time  1.5 min 5 min 12 min 
Experts’ inputs Yes No No 
Black box No Yes No 
Subjective Yes No No 
Handle ambiguity No No Yes 
User-friendly Yes No No 
Average MSE --- 16.59 12.24 
On the other hand, the ANN model utilizes self-organized mapping algorithm 
(SOM) to rate vulnerability of the interdependent assets based on recognized patterns in 
each dataset. The ANN model is a data driven model requiring sufficient amount of 
observed patterns, more than 500 datasets, and extensive effort in modeling with less 
involvement required from experts. The ANN model also lacks the ability to consider 
ambiguity due to experts’ input. 
The FCM model is also a data driven model requiring sufficient amount of 
observed patterns, more than 500 datasets, but accounts for ambiguity in rating 
vulnerability of interdependent assets. The computational time for the FCM model is 1.4 
times the computational time for the ANN model.  
The results of the developed vulnerability techniques were shared with three 
experts; one from the city of London and two from the City of Hamilton. Their feedback 
can be summarized in the following two points: 
 The developed vulnerability techniques will be useful for staff to justify 
increases to intervention budgets to City Councils. Currently intervention 
actions are taken based on current condition of infrastructure assets without 
considering their neighbouring assets condition as well.  
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 In spite of the relatively complicated nature of the ANN and FCM models (AI 
models), the experts were relatively comfortable using these models. Both cities 
are relatively advanced in using asset management tools and currently has other 
systems based on MDP, Fuzzy Sets and the Analytical Hierarchy Process. 
Experts commented that this might not be the case with other municipalities that 
are still starting their asset management programs. 
For the SD model, the experts agreed that the SD model is beneficial as a 
computational platform for exploring the effect of intervention policies at bundle and 
network level. They acknowledged that the model is flexible enough to add or remove 
variables based on the available data for each city. The experts however pointed out that 
the SD model can be enhanced by accounting for factors related to social and economic 
characteristics of their customers. Customers have different perceptions about expected 
LOS based on their age, income, social and political preferences. They are interested in 
computational platforms for objectively quantifying the effect of such factors on the 
integrated asset management approach. For the SD at bundle level, the performance was 
satisfactory for the experts as the model was capable of exploring large search space in 
few seconds. On the hand, the modified genetic algorithm can be enhanced more by the 
deployment of parallel computing techniques to decrease its computational time. They 
also suggested benchmarking GA performance against other exact and non-exact 
algorithms when using parallel computing techniques. 
6.5  Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter described an analysis for the developed models on two case studies 
to optimize a value driven and near optimal intervention polices for civil infrastructure 
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networks considering their spatial and functional interdependencies. Three developed 
computational techniques were utilized to rate vulnerability of civil infrastructure 
systems considering their spatial and functional interdependencies with neighboring 
assets. The three computational models were; 1) MAUT, 2) ANN and 3) FCM. The 
FCM model showed strong performance in mimicking experts’ judgement compared to 
ANN model. The experts were relatively comfortable using these models however they 
commented that this might not be the case with other municipalities that are still starting 
their asset management programs. 
The SD was supplemented by a dynamic programming algorithm at the bundle 
level to find the best n intervention policies. This will aid in decreasing the need for 
sufficient experience in selecting a set of near optimum solutions. The SD was 
supplemented with modified GA algorithm to find near optimum intervention policies 
at network level. The modified GA utilized the set of optimum policies at bundle level 
provided by the SD and dynamic programming to seed its initial population. The SD 
model was capable of providing the decision maker with a platform to explore possible 
cost effective intervention policies for interdependent assets at bundle and network 
levels. A comparison between traditional and modified GA was presented to show the 
effect of the added enhancements on decreasing the computational time. The experts 
pointed out 1) the need for integrating more factors about social and economic 
characteristics of their customers, 2) the modified genetic algorithm can be enhanced 
more by parallel computing techniques to decrease its computational time and 3) they 
also suggested benchmarking GA performance against other exact and non-exact 
techniques when using parallel computing techniques. 
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Chapter 7 : CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORKS  
7.1 Summary and Conclusions 
Current decision support systems for infrastructure management are 
implemented ignoring spatial and functional interdependencies that exist between water, 
sewer and road network assets. This research presents a framework for optimizing 
intervention policies for municipal infrastructure assets considering spatial and 
functional interdependencies as well as vulnerability of these networks. The developed 
research framework consists of three models; 1) interdependency assessment model, 2) 
vulnerability assessment model and 3) system dynamics model. 
The interdependency assessment model captures interdependent assets by 
utilizing two modules: spatial interdependency module and functional interdependency 
module. The spatial module was developed and coded using python programming 
language in ArcGIS environment; making use of its geoprocessing tools in determining 
geographically interdependent assets. The spatial module encapsulates the 
interdependent assets in a set of newly developed layers and a newly generated database 
containing essential characteristics of such interdependencies. On the other hand, the 
functional module employs principles of graph theory in determining an asset's degree 
of connectivity with its neighboring assets. The functional module will aid in 
recognizing the likely influence of an asset failure on its neighboring assets' performance 
using “betweenness centrality”. The functional module was also implemented using 
python and was embedded in ArcGIS to facilitate the analysis of large scale networks. 
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The output of the interdependency assessment model is in the form of bundles of 
spatially and functionally interdependent assets.   
For vulnerability assessment, the research investigated the use of three 
computational techniques to rate vulnerability of civil infrastructure systems considering 
their spatial and functional interdependencies with neighboring assets. The three 
developed computational models were; 1) multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT), 2) 
artificial neural network (ANN) and 3) fuzzy c-mean clustering (FCM). Operation and 
maintenance reports obtained from two Canadian municipalities, Cities of London and 
Hamilton, Ontario, were used to select factors influencing the vulnerability of water, 
sewer and road assets. For the MAUT model and based on the identified factors from 
operation and maintenance reports, surveys were sent to experts and their feedback was 
elicited to construct utility functions to rate the vulnerability of interdependent assets. 
On the other hand, the ANN model utilizes self-organized mapping algorithm (SOM) to 
rate vulnerability of these assets based on recognized patterns in each dataset. The ANN 
model is a data driven model requiring sufficient amount of observed patterns and 
extensive effort in modeling with less involvement required from experts. On the other 
hand, the FCM model is capable of accounting for ambiguity and imprecision associated 
with experts’ inputs in rating vulnerability of interdependent assets. Based on the 
available datasets, the FCM model outperformed the ANN model in mimicking experts’ 
knowledge for rating vulnerability of interdependent assets as was shown in Chapter 6. 
The algorithms for FCM and ANN models were developed and implemented using 
MATLAB programming language inside MATLAB 2013. The MAUT model was 
developed and implemented inside the Excel environment.  
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Subsequently, the system dynamics (SD) model was developed to find cost 
effective intervention polices accounting for interdependent infrastructure assets to meet 
customers' expectations and decrease assets’ vulnerability. The SD model consists of 23 
variables and 8 causal feedback loops; two extracted from the literature and the rest were 
constructed based on four unstructured interviews with three experts. Two optimization 
algorithms were augmented with SD to find optimal intervention policies at bundle and 
network levels respectively. These algorithms are 1) dynamic programing algorithm, 2) 
single objective genetic algorithm (GA). Two case studies were presented to 
demonstrate the application of the developed framework and its expected contributions 
using data obtained from the Cities of London and Hamilton, Ontario. The SD model 
was capable of providing decision makers with a platform to explore possible cost 
effective intervention policies and examine a number of generated scenarios. Three 
enhancements were introduced to the developed GA algorithm; 1) filtering query-based 
function to minimize the computational time, 2) adding a dynamic memory to store 
worst solutions to prevent regeneration of these solutions in subsequent trials and 3) 
modifying the mutation function to act as local search procedure to improve the 
convergence rate of GA. A comparison between the traditional and modified GA was 
presented to show the effect of the added enhancements. Validation of these models was 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
7.2 Research Contribution 
The contributions of this research are:  
1- For the interdependency assessment model; development of an 
automated model to construct bundles of interdependent assets 
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inside ArcGIS 10 using python. The model utilises available 
geoprocessing tools inside ArcGIS™ to encapsulate spatially 
interdependent assets and then assesses their functional 
interdependencies using betweenness centrality as described in 
Chapter 4.   
2- For data collection; in-depth analysis of two datasets from two 
case studies was conducted in order to understand current 
practices and assist in the design of the developed framework and 
subsequently in testing and validating the developments made.  
3- For the vulnerability assessment model; development and 
implementation of three computational models (FCM, ANN and 
MAUT) to rate vulnerability of interdependent assets and rating 
their respective performance. Implementation of the algorithms 
for FCM and ANN models was carried out in MATLAB™ 2013. 
The MAUT was developed and implemented in MS Excel™ 
2013 environment.  
4- For the SD model; development and implementation of an 
automated SD model to find cost effective intervention actions 
accounting for interdependent assets. The developed SD model is 
capable of generating intervention policy reports in three 
granularities (i.e. single asset level, bundle level and network 
level). This model constitutes several contributions: 
170 
 
1) Developing a SD model for integrated asset management 
as described in Chapter 4. While limited number of 
interviews (i.e. four interviews) were conducted to build 
the SD model, it can be used as a proof of concept on how 
SD can be developed and implemented to find cost 
effective intervention policies. Six feedback loops were 
constructed based on these interviews.  
2) Supplementing the SD model with a dynamic 
programming algorithm to optimize intervention policies 
at the bundle level. When using SD only, sufficient 
knowledge and experience are required to select a set of 
near optimal solutions that cope with decision makers’ 
preferences. Supplementing the SD model with a dynamic 
programming algorithm will overcome such limitations.  
3) Supplementing the SD model with the developed GA 
algorithm to aid decision makers in finding near optimum 
intervention policies at network level. The developed GA 
algorithm is enhanced by; 1) filtering query-based 
function, 2) dynamic memory and 3) modifying the 
mutation function to act as local search procedure. 
7.3 Limitations 
The limitations of the developed research framework are: 
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1. For the vulnerability model, the performance of the developed three models 
needs to be benchmarked against other unsupervised learning algorithms.  
2. For the SD model, it was constructed based on four unstructured interviews. 
More interviews are required to expand the SD model and enhance its structure. 
Also, the performance of the two developed optimization algorithms need to be 
benchmarked against other exact and non-exact optimization algorithms. 
3. For vulnerability and SD models; the developed models were tested and 
validated using two case studies. Further validation is needed to measure the 
performance of these developed models on other case studies. This will improve 
the generality of the developed models and its robustness. 
7.4 Future Work 
The following are some recommendations for future work: 
1- Analyzing more operation and maintenance reports from other 
cities to enhance the robustness of the developed vulnerability 
model with more inputs. 
2- Utilizing parallel computing techniques to decrease further the 
computational time needed for finding optimum intervention 
policies at network level.  
3- Conducing more interviews to elicit additional experts’ 
knowledge to expand the SD model and enhance its structure. 
4- Investigating how condition assessment polices can be integrated 
along with intervention polices to establish more comprehensive 
framework for managing interdependent infrastructure networks. 
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5- Exploring and understanding the relationship between 
interdependency assessment, vulnerability assessment and risk 
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Appendix A : Fuzzy Set Theory 
Fuzzy logic and fuzzy rule based systems, which are based on fuzzy logic, offer an 
approach for reasoning which can encapsulate the imprecision in rules and model assertions 
conveyed by human experts (Buckley, 2005). Fuzzy logic enables reasoning using approximations 
but this does not imply vague or fuzzy outputs for problem solutions as the imprecisely identified 
inputs are transformed into precise numerical inputs which produce precise numerical outputs 
(Ross, 2010). Fuzzy logic and systems based on it are an actively investigated topic in many fields 
including engineering and computer science, business and management, psychology, philosophy, 
and mathematics. Roughly, Fuzzy system applications may be grouped into two categories (Yuan 
(1995), Buckley (2005)): 
1. Fuzzy control systems 
2. Fuzzy decision support systems 
A control system continuously receives sensor for inputs (i.e. speed, distance, temperature, 
pressure…etc.) and employ these inputs to adjust various output variables (i.e. amount of electric 
current flowing into an electric motor, rate of fuel supply to an engine ….etc.) (Buckley, 2005). 
The fuzzy control systems are implemented to attain a smoother and efficient operation, for 
example, a self-regulated air conditioner that maintains desirable temperature and humidity with 
less fluctuation and greater energy efficiency (Buckley, 2005). On the other hand, fuzzy decision 
support systems are utilized to make decision based using the knowledge base that fuzzifies, 
aggregates and defuzzified the inputs to single or multiple decision outputs.  
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The steps needed to formulate a fuzzy system are summarized in Figure A-1. The following 
sections clarify the foundation of fuzzy set theory and illustrate comprehensively the various 
necessary steps to establish fuzzy expert system. 
 
Figure A-1 Fuzzy expert system steps 
Fuzzy Sets and Crisp Sets 
In classical logic, the boundary between what is in a set and what is outside is crisp or 
sharp. For instance, all people with height bigger than 180cm are considered in the set of very tall 
people. Anyone less than 180cm is not in the set of tall people even if that person is 179cm and 
because of the sharpness of the set boundary, such sets are known as crisp sets. As the domain (in 
this case the height) value increases, the degree of membership in the set tall people remains false 




Figure A-2 Crisp set in classical logic (Yuan, 1995) 
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For a fuzzy set, the membership value lies within the range zero (no membership) to 1 
(complete membership). For example, the membership graph of the fuzzy set very tall people may 
have the shape shown in  Figure A-3. According to this membership function, someone with height 
of 175cm will have a membership value of 0.5, and a height of 179 will have a membership value 
of 0.9. All heights at or below 170 cm will have the membership value zero and all those at or 
above 180 will have membership value 1. 
Figure A-4 shows the membership functions of three fuzzy sets examples; medium, tall 
and very tall. These three membership functions are bell-shaped. Depending on the application, 
data availability and experts’ opinions, fuzzy set membership functions can have different shapes 
including S-shape, triangle, and trapezoid….ect. By allowing continuous valued degrees of 
membership, fuzzy sets enable the handling of imprecise concepts which are commonly 
encountered in real life problems.  


















Figure A-4 Fuzzy membership function for medium, tall and very tall people (Yuan, 1995) 
Fuzzy Logic and Probability Theory  
There has been a lot of discussion about the nature of fuzzy logic ever since it appeared in 
the 70s by Zadeh (1965). Many are quite dismissive about fuzzy logic and regard it as just a form 
of probability and despite their apparent similarity; there is an important difference between the 
two paradigms (Yuan, 1995). Both fuzzy logic and probability deal with the issue of uncertainty. 
Both use a continuous 0 to 1 scale for measuring uncertainty, but with a fundamental difference. 
Probability deals with likelihood – the chance of something happening or something having a 
certain property. Fuzzy logic deals not with likelihood of something having a certain property, but 
the degree to which it has that property (Buckley, 2005). For instance, if a fair coin is tossed one 
time, both tail and head have an equal probability of 0.5. In this context, the probability attempts 
to predict the likelihood of it landing with the head or tail face up. When the coin has landed, there 
is nothing ambiguous about the outcome of the tossing and therefore the probability is no longer 
applicable, nor necessary. On the other hand, consider a badly defaced coin, there would be 
uncertainty as to whether a face is actually the head or the tail (Yuan, 1995). It is in this situation 













or tail. In other words, fuzzy logic concerns not the likelihood of the event (head or tail), but the 
degree to which the event has happened (possibility) (Yuan, 1995).  
Fuzzy reasoning 
The fuzzy model of a problem consists of a series of unconditional and conditional fuzzy 
propositions. These are similar in form to those in conventional expert systems.  An unconditional 
fuzzy proposition has the form  
a is B 
Where ‘a’ is a linguistic variable and B is the name of a fuzzy set. ‘a’ is called a linguistic 
variable because its value in the proposition is expressed by a human expert using a word 
(linguistic expression) rather than a number. For example: 
‘Pipe condition is low’ 
During the reasoning process, the truth value of this proposition is given by the degree of 
membership of pipe condition in the fuzzy set low. This membership value is computed from the 
actual case-specific numeric value with which pipe condition is instantiated, and the fuzzy 
membership function low. A fuzzy conditional proposition or rule has the form 
IF a is B THEN c is D 
It is interpreted as:  ‘a’ is a member of ‘B’ to the degree that’ c’ is a member of ‘D’. In 
other words, the consequent (RHS) of the rule is applied or executed only to the extent that the 
antecedent (LHS) is true. For example in the rule 
IF pipe condition is fair THEN risk is high 
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The membership value of risk in the fuzzy set high is determined by the membership value 
of pipe condition in set fair. So for example, if the antecedent has a truth value of 0.5, the strength 
of the consequent will also be 0.5, and the fuzzy region1 for the set high for risk will be truncated 
to level 0.5. In reasoning using fuzzy logic, a number of fuzzy propositions is evaluated for their 
degrees of truth, and all those having some truth contribute to the final output state of the solution 
variable (Buckley, 2005). Unlike conventional expert systems, where statements are executed 
serially, fuzzy logic systems are based on the parallel processing principle. In other words, all rules 
are fired even if not all of them contribute to the final outcome and some may contribute only 
partially. For example, in determining the value of the solution variable risk in the above example, 
the contribution of the rule to making it high will be to a degree of 0.5. 
IF pipe condition is fair THEN risk is high 
A number of other rules may also contribute to varying degrees to the truth value of a high 
risk. All these truth values, represented visually by corresponding fuzzy regions, are combined to 
give the aggregate truth value for high risk (min-max rule). There will also be other rules which 
will be fired to give truth values for propositions risk is medium and risk is low. The ultimate 
solution value of the variable risk is determined once again through a combination process, this 
time aggregating the fuzzy spaces for high, medium and low risk.  
The numerical output value for a solution variable is computed from the aggregated fuzzy 
output region through a process known as defuzzification. Although the reasoning process is 
performed using fuzzy rules and inference, the values input by the user and that produced by the 
fuzzy system are non-fuzzy numerical values. The input values are fuzzified (converted into 
                                                 
1 The fuzzy region of a set is the area covered by its membership graph. 
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various fuzzy set membership values) to allow fuzzy reasoning, and then the resulting fuzzy (set 
membership) values are transformed into exact numerical values to make them applicable to the 
problem at hand. 
Min-Max rule 
Fuzzy rules of inference are used to combine the fuzzy regions produced by the application 
of many rules run in parallel.  The most common rule for this purpose is known as the min-max 
rule. The consequent region of a fuzzy rule is restricted to the antecedent (LHS) truth or 
membership value. Given the fuzzy rule: 
IF pipe condition is fair THEN risk is high  
If the membership value of pipe condition in X is 0.5, then the degree of truth of the 
consequent (membership value of risk in high) will be 0.5. When the LHS of the rule consists of a 
number of fuzzy propositions, the composite membership value of the LHS is the minimum of the 
memberships of all of the propositions on the LHS. This minimum truth value from the LHS is 
applied to that of the consequent (RHS). As an example, given the rule: 
IF pipe condition is fair AND pipe diameter is large THEN risk is high 
If the membership value of pipe condition in fair is 0.5, and that of pipe diameter in large 
is 0.2, the degree of truth of the consequent (membership value of risk in high) will be 0.2. If a 
number of rules lead to different membership values for an output variable, the maximum of these 
values is taken as the membership value. For example, given a number of rules producing different 
truth values T1, T2, .., Tn for the membership of risk in high, the aggregated truth value is 
maximum(T1, T2, .., Tn ). For example if application of the following rules lead to differing 
membership values (shown in parentheses) for the output variable risk in the fuzzy set medium: 
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 IF pipe condition is good THEN risk is medium (0.3) 
 IF traffic load is medium THEN risk is medium (0.2) 
 IF soil is loose THEN risk is medium (0.8) 
Then, variable risk will have a membership value of max (0.3, 0.2, 0.8) is 0.8 in medium.  
Defuzzification 
 
With the application of a host of similar rules for the pipe risk in the above example, the 
membership values for risk in the low and high sets will also be similarly evaluated using the min-
max rules. Suppose these values are 0.4 for small, 0.8 for medium, and 0.2 for high. These 
membership values will truncate the fuzzy spaces for the sets small, medium and high. These fuzzy 















Figure A-5 Defuzzification process 
Defuzzification is the process of taking the aggregated fuzzy region for the output variable 
– in this case risk, and assigning an exact numerical value to it. There are a number of methods of 


















gravity method. The centre of gravity is simply the weighted average of the output membership 



















Where di is the i
th domain value, m(di) is the membership value for that domain point. In 
this example, the domain in question is that of the variable risk, with ith in the range [0,100]. The 
diagram below illustrates the centroid method of defuzzification. 
 
Figure A-6 Defuzzification of risk 
Implementation of fuzzy expert system 
The actions of a fuzzy expert system are shaped by the rule base and there are five phases 













1. Identifying and listing the input variables with projected ranges. 
2. Identifying and listing the output variables and projected ranges. 
3. Defining the fuzzy membership function associated with each input and output variable. 
4. Constructing the rule base that will govern the fuzzy controller’s operation. 
5. Selecting a defuzzification technique to aggregate to arrive at an output. 
The above steps are illustrated with a simplified hypothetical example below. The next 
sections illustrates how to implement the controller of fuzzy expert system that is to be used to rate 
the vulnerability for water mains. The example uses two inputs: 1) pipe condition 2) buried depth. 
to arrive at single output (vulnerability rating). 
Step 1: Identifying and listing the input variables with projected ranges. 
There are two input variables: pipe condition and buried depth. There are five ranges each 
of pipe condition and buried depth (m) as shown inTable A-1 and Table A-2 : 
Table A-1 Pipe condition range 
Range of linguistic values: Low High 
Excellent 5 5 
Good 4 4 
Fair 3 3 
Poor 2 2 





Table A-2 Buried depth range 
Range of linguistic values: Low High 
Large 10 ∞ 
Medium 6 11 
Short 4 8 
Very short 0 5 
  
Step 2: Identify and list the linguistic output variables and their numeric ranges 
The two inputs will be used to arrive at single output which is the vulnerability rating whose 
range is shown in Table A-3. 
Table A-3 Vulnerability rating range 
Range of linguistic values: Low High 
Full 70 100 
Medium 40 85 
Slight 0 45 
 
Step 3: Defining the fuzzy membership function associated with each input and output 
variable. 
The low and high values are utilized to set the boundary of each membership function for 
the inputs and output. For the pipe condition, the pipe can be only in one position and therefore 
the membership function is linear as depicted in Figure A-7. On the other hand, the classification 
of the buried depth into various linguistic ranges is subjective and a triangular, trapezoidal, bell 
shape …ect. Can be selected based on the experts elicited opinions.  The vulnerability rating shares 
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the same concept with buried depth as shown in Figure A-8 and Figure A-9. The height of each 
function is 1.0 and the function bounds do not exceed the high and low ranges listed for each range. 
 
Figure A-7 Pipe condition membership function 
 
Figure A-8 Buried depth membership function 
 
Figure A-9 Vulnerability rating membership function 




































A rule base can be visualized as a matrix of combinations of each of the input range variable 
and with the intersection of each matrix input, the associated output range variable can determined. 
The rule base matrix for this simple example problem has only 25 rules that describe the interaction 
between input and output variables. Each entry in the rule base is defined by AND which combine 
the inputs to produce the output. As an example, the shaded matrix entry above means: 
IF pipe condition is poor AND IF buried depth is large THEN vulnerability rating is low. 
IF pipe condition is failure AND IF buried depth is short THEN vulnerability rating is high. 








Large Low Low Low Low Low 
Medium Low Low Medium Medium Medium 
Short Medium Medium High High High 
Very short Medium Medium High High High 
 
It should be noted that when (n) input variables are considered, an (n) matrix surface is 
expected. 
Step 5: Selecting a defuzzification technique to arrive at a single output. 
By applying the centroid defuzzification which was described already on the following inputs: 
 Pipe condition = 4 
 Buried depth = 7 m 
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The inputs are fuzzifed to determine which membership functions are activated and to what 
degree. Three membership functions are activated: the pipe condition function for condition 4, and 
the buried depth functions for medium and short. For the pipe condition at 4, the membership 
function is discrete and therefore the membership function is 1 and can be written as: 
Mpoor(4) = 1 ……………………………………………………………………….Equation A-2 
  The membership of the buried depth of 7 m in the fuzzy set for short is 0.65 and in the 
fuzzy set for medium is 0.65. Mathematically, they are denoted as 
Mshort(6.5) = 0.65……………………………………………………………………Equation A-3 
Mmedium(6.5) = 0.65………………………………………………………………….Equation A-4 
This results in two rules firing in the rule base matrix as shown in  








Large Low Low Low Low Low 
Medium Low Low Medium Medium Medium 
Short Medium Medium High High High 
Very short Medium Medium High High High 
 
It should be noted that when (n) input variables are considered, an (n) matrix surface is 
expected. 
Step 5: Selecting a defuzzification technique to arrive at a single output. 
By applying the centroid defuzzification which was described already on the following inputs: 
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 Pipe condition = 4 
 Buried depth = 7 m 
. Next, the membership values are combined together using the AND (min) operator for 
each rule combination: 
Rule 1: Mpoor AND Mshort = min(1.0, 0.65)  =  0.65 
Rule 2: Mpoor AND Mmedium = min(1.0, 0.65)  =  0.65 
Next the output value for each rule is determined by truncating the corresponding output 














Appendix B : MAUT Survey 
Dear Sir/ Madame, 
My name is Ahmed A. Youssef, PhD student in the area of Construction Engineering and 
Management at Concordia University, Montreal, Canada. I am currently conducting a research on 
vulnerability assessment of interdependent infrastructure networks. The focus of this research is 
on water, sewer and road assets. 
I would like to seek your assistance in my research as I am currently trying to gather information 
about factors used to assess vulnerability of infrastructure networks to be used in my database. I 
would be grateful if you could complete the attached questionnaire. 
The information gathered from the questionnaire will be used to develop a computer program to 
assess vulnerability of interdependent networks. Please be assured that all information shared will 
be strictly confidential and used only for academic purposes. Please do not hesitate to contact me 




Ahmed A. Youssef 
PhD student 
Department of Building, Civil, & Environmental Engineering  
Concordia University Montreal, Quebec Canada 
 
Osama Moselhi, PhD, Professor 
1515 St. Catherine W. H3G 1M8 Dep. Building, Civil, & Environmental Engineering – Concordia 




Questionnaire Form  
All responses will remain STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL and will be used for educational and 
research purposes only.  
 
PART 1: COMPANY’S PROFILE 
COMPANY’S NAME: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
TITLE OR POSITION OF RESPONDENT: --------------------------------------------------  
ADDRESS:  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TELEPHONE/ FAX / WEBSITE / E-MAIL:  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   











PART 2: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
Vulnerability assessment, in this survey, measures an asset’s degree of susceptibility for structural 
and/or functional failures triggered by failure of these functions in neighboring assets. For each 
asset type, you are asked to assign relative weights for each factor of the ten identified factors. You 
will be subsequently asked to establish utility functions for vulnerability rating as well.  
1. Water assets:  
a. Weight assignment 
Assume that a hypothetical segment of water is interdependent with a sewer segment or a road 
segment. Please, try to complete the following table to show the importance of the following 
factors’ weight. The total percentages should sum to 100. 
Factor Weight 
Spatial factors 
Asset condition  
Neighboring asset condition  
Soil type  
Pipe length  
Buried depth  
Pipe diameter  
Functional factors 
Number of affected customers  
Customers type  
Response time  
Betweenness centrality  
 
b. Utility functions 
For each of the above identified factors, please type to construct a utility function. You are asked 
to rate your satisfaction over a range of achievement levels on each factor. First start by identifying 
the highest and lowest values to be assigned arbitrary values with 0 and 1, respectively. Then, try 
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2. Sewer asset 
a. Weight assignment 
Assume that a hypothetical segment of sewer is interdependent with a water segment or a road 
segment. Please, try to complete the following table to show the importance of the following 
factors’ weight. The total percentages should sum to 100. 
Factor Weight 
Spatial factors 
Asset condition  
Neighboring asset condition  
Soil type  
Pipe length  
Buried depth  
Pipe diameter  
Functional factors 
Number of affected customers  
Customers type  
Response time  
Betweenness centrality  
 
b. Utility functions 
For each of the above identified factors, please type to construct a utility function. You are asked 
to rate your satisfaction over a range of achievement levels on each factor. First start by identifying 
the highest and lowest values to be assigned arbitrary values with 0 and 1, respectively. Then, try 
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3. Road asset 
a. Weight assignment 
Assume that a hypothetical segment of road is interdependent with a water segment or a sewer 
segment. Please, try to complete the following table to show the importance of the following 
factors’ weight. The total percentages should sum to 100. 
Factor Weight 
Spatial factors 
Asset condition  
Neighboring asset condition  
Soil type  
Pipe length  
Buried depth  
Pipe diameter  
Functional factors 
Average daily traffic  
Road type  
Response time  
Betweenness centrality  
 
b. Utility functions 
For each of the above identified factors, please type to construct a utility function. You are asked 
to rate your satisfaction over a range of achievement levels on each factor. First start by identifying 
the highest and lowest values to be assigned arbitrary values with 0 and 1, respectively. Then, try 
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1. Water assets: 

























































































































































































































2. Sewer assets: 





















































































































































































































3. Road assets: 































































































































f) Functional Factors 
 
 



















































































Appendix C : Sample of the SD Output 
(Bundle Level) 
Policy ID(1) (Sample) 
 Water Road 
Year Action Condition V Ts Cost Action Condition Vul Ts Cost 
1 Do 
nothing 
3 4 60 0 Do 
nothing 
1 6 75 0 
2 Do 
nothing 
3.1 4 58 0 Do 
nothing 
1.21 6 72.1 0 
3 Do 
nothing 
3.2 4 56.1 0 Do 
nothing 
1.32 6.3 67.2 0 
4 Do 
nothing 
3.35 4 52.4 0 Do 
nothing 
1.45 6.4 63.1 0 
5 Do 
nothing 
3.47 4 50.2 0 Do 
nothing 
1.57 6.51 57.7 0 
6 Do 
nothing 
3.6 4 48.2 0 Do 
nothing 
1.68 6.7 52.4 0 
7 Do 
nothing 
3.81 4 45.5 0 Do 
nothing 
1.84 6.9 48.1 0 
8 Do 
nothing 
3.97 4 40.5 0 Do 
nothing 
1.92 7.1 44.8 0 
9 Major 
Action 
1 1 100 56700 Do 
nothing 
2.01 1 82.1 0 
10 Do 
nothing 
1.15 1 99 0 Do 
nothing 
2.2 1 81.8 0 
 
V: Vulnerability rating  






Policy ID (6) (Sample) 
 Water Road 
Year Action Condition V Ts Cost Action Condition V Ts Cost 
1 Do 
nothing 
3 4 60 0 Do 
nothing 
1 6 75 0 
2 Major 
Action 
1 1.2 100 47561 Do 
nothing 
1.21 6 72.1 0 
3 Do 
nothing 
3.2 4 98.3 0 Do 
nothing 
1.32 6.3 67.2 0 
4 Do 
nothing 
3.35 4 96.4 0 Do 
nothing 
1.45 6.4 63.1 0 
5 Do 
nothing 
3.47 4 94.2 0 Do 
nothing 
1.57 6.51 57.7 0 
6 Do 
nothing 
3.6 4 92.2 0 Do 
nothing 
1.68 6.7 52.4 0 
7 Do 
nothing 
3.81 4 89.5 0 Do 
nothing 
1.84 6.9 48.1 0 
8 Do 
nothing 
3.97 4 87.5 0 Do 
nothing 
1.92 7.1 44.8 0 
9 Do 
nothing 
1 1 86.1 0 Do 
nothing 
2.01 1 82.1 0 
10 Do 
nothing 
1.15 1 85.3 0 Do 
nothing 
2.2 1 81.8 0 
 
V: Vulnerability rating  








Appendix D : Coding Samples 
/* 
These are code samples for the following functions: 
1- Importing inputs and exporting outputs. 
2- Causal loops (R1, R2, R3 and R4). 
3- Dynamic programming algorithm (selecting intervention actions and 
sorting best solutions).  
4- Genetic algorithm (population initialization and sorting). 
*/ 









using Excel = Microsoft.Office.Interop.Excel; 
namespace Assets_Inter_Dependency 
{ 
    public partial class Form1 : Form   //taking users inputs from user form 1  
    { 
        double L1 = 0.0; 
        double L2 = 0.0; 
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        double L = 0.0; 
        public Form1() 
        { 
            InitializeComponent(); 
        } 
        private void bt_start_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            // set mouse cursor to busy while executing 
            Cursor.Current = Cursors.WaitCursor; 
            // read assets data from execl file 
            readXlData(); 
            Global_Var.bundles_arr = new double[Global_Var.bundles_data.GetLength(0), 25]; 
            double[] asset_data = new double[10]; 
             int x = 0; x <= Global_Var.bundles_data.GetLength(0)-1; x++ 
 // R1 
            // calculate vulnerability  
            for (int x = 0; x <= Global_Var.bundles_data.GetLength(0)-1; x++) 
            { 
                label5.Text = (x+1).ToString(); 
                label5.Refresh(); 
                label7.Text = Global_Var.bundles_data.GetLength(0).ToString(); 
                double[] intial_condition = new double[9]; 
                for (int y = 0; y <= 8; y++) 
                { 
                    Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, y] = Global_Var.bundles_data[x, y]; 
                    asset_data[y] = Global_Var.bundles_data[x, y]; 
                } 
            // set level of service 
             Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 9] = Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 8]; 
            // Neighboring Asset Condition 
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            asset_data[9] = Global_Var.bundles_data[x, 17]; 
            // calculate vulnerablity 
            Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 10] = calculate_Vulnerablity(asset_data); 
            // calculate total satisfaction for the road 
Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 11] = calculate_road_score(Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 8], 
Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 9], Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 10]); 
            // set constrains conditions 
            intial_condition[0] = Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 8]; 
            intial_condition[1] = Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 9]; 
            intial_condition[2] = Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 10]; 
            intial_condition[3] = Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 11]; 
            for (int y = 0; y <= 8; y++) 
                { 
                    Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, y + 12] = Global_Var.bundles_data[x, y + 9]; 
                    asset_data[y] = Global_Var.bundles_data[x, y + 9]; 
                } 
            // R3 
            // set level of service 
            Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 21] = Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 20]; 
            // Neighboring Asset Condition 
              asset_data[9] = Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 8]; 
             // calculate vulnerability 
            Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 22] = calculate_Vulnerablity(asset_data); 
             // calculate score 
Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 23] = calculate_water_score(Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 20], 
Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 21], Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 22]); 
                // calculate total score 
Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 24] = Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 11] + 
Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 23]; 
                // set constrains 
             intial_condition[4] = Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 20]; 
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             intial_condition[5] = Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 21]; 
             intial_condition[6] = Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 22]; 
             intial_condition[7] = Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 23]; 
             intial_condition[8] = Global_Var.bundles_arr[x, 24]; 
             // optimize intervention actions at bundle level (using Dynamic programming) 
             find_policy(x); 
             // rank the senarios  
             for (int i = 0; i <= 99; i++) 
                { 
                    for (int y = 0; y <= 8; y++) 
                    { 
                        asset_data[y] = Global_Var.bundles_data[x, y]; 
                    } 
asset_data[8] = 
Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Convert.ToInt32(Global_Var.Senario_log
ger[i, Global_Var.intervention_period]), 8], 0); 
asset_data[9] = 
Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Convert.ToInt32(Global_Var.Senario_log
ger[i, Global_Var.intervention_period]), 18], 0); 
                     // set level of service 
                     double los1 = asset_data[8]; 
                     // calculate road vulnerablity 
                     double vul1 = calculate_Vulnerablity(asset_data); 
    // calculate vulnerability score 
                     double road_score = calculate_road_score(asset_data[8], los1, vul1); 
                     for (int y = 0; y <= 8; y++) 
                    { 
                        asset_data[y] = Global_Var.bundles_data[x, y + 9]; 
                    } 
asset_data[8] = 
Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Convert.ToInt32(Global_Var.Senario_logge





r[i, Global_Var.intervention_period]), 8], 0); 
                    // set level of service 
                    double los2 = asset_data[8]; 
                    // calculate water vulnerablity 
                    double vul2 = calculate_Vulnerablity(asset_data); 
                    // calculate score 
                    double water_score = calculate_road_score(asset_data[8], los2, vul2); 
         //R4 
                    // calculate total score for the bundle 
                    double total_score = road_score + water_score; 
                    Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[i, 0] = i; 
                    Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[i, 1] = total_score; 
                } 
                // ranking array bubble sort (for best scenarios) 
                for (int i = 99; i >= 1; i--) 
                { 
                    for (int j = 0; j <= i - 1; j++) 
                    { 
                  if (Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[j, 1] > Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[j + 1, 1]) 
                        { 
                     //swap the two values 
                      double temp0 = Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[j, 0]; 
                      double temp1 = Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[j, 1]; 
                      Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[j, 0] = Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[j + 1, 0]; 
                      Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[j, 1] = Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[j + 1, 1]; 
                      Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[j + 1, 0] = temp0; 
                      Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[j + 1, 1] = temp1; 
                        } 
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                    } 
                } 
                // rank the rest of scenarios 
                for (int i = 100; i <= Global_Var.Senario_counter.GetLength(0) - 1; i++) 
                { 
                    // flag to see if new score need to be recorded 
                    int rank_flag = -1; 
                    for (int y = 0; y <= 8; y++) 
                    { 
                        asset_data[y] = Global_Var.bundles_data[x, y]; 
                    } 
asset_data[8] = 
Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Convert.ToInt32(Global_Var.Senario_logge
r[i, Global_Var.intervention_period]), 8], 0); 
asset_data[9] = 
Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Convert.ToInt32(Global_Var.Senario_logge
r[i, Global_Var.intervention_period]), 18], 0); 
                    // set level of service 
                    double los1 = asset_data[8]; 
                    // calculate road vulnerablity 
                    double vul1 = calculate_Vulnerablity(asset_data); 
                    // calculate score 
                    double road_score = calculate_road_score(asset_data[8], los1, vul1); 
                    for (int y = 0; y <= 8; y++) 
                    { 
                        asset_data[y] = Global_Var.bundles_data[x, y + 9]; 
                    } 
asset_data[8] = 
Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Convert.ToInt32(Global_Var.Senario_log
ger[i, Global_Var.intervention_period]), 18], 0); 
asset_data[9] = 
Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Convert.ToInt32(Global_Var.Senario_log
ger[i, Global_Var.intervention_period]), 8], 0); 
227 
 
                     // set level of service 
                     double los2 = asset_data[8]; 
                     // calculate water vulnerablity 
                     double vul2 = calculate_Vulnerablity(asset_data); 
                     // calculate score 
                     double water_score = calculate_road_score(asset_data[8], los2, vul2); 
                     // calculate total score 
                     double total_score = road_score + water_score; 
                     for (int h = 0; h <= 9; h++) 
                    { 
                        if (total_score > Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[h, 1]) 
                        { 
                            rank_flag++; 
                        } 
                    } 
                    if (rank_flag > -1) 
                    { 
                        for (int nrow = 0; nrow <= rank_flag - 1; nrow++) 
                        { 
                            for (int ncol = 0; ncol <= 1; ncol++) 
                            { 
Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[nrow, ncol] = 
Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[nrow + 1, ncol]; 
                            } 
                        } 
                        Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[rank_flag, 0] = i; 
                        Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[rank_flag, 1] = total_score; 
                    } 
                } 
 // extracting the solutions at bundle level 
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            Excel.Application xlApp = new Excel.Application(); 
            xlApp.Visible = false; 
            //Excel.Workbook wb; 
            //Excel.Worksheet ws; 
Excel.Workbook wb =   
xlApp.Workbooks.Add(Excel.XlWBATemplate.xlWBATWorksheet); 
            Excel.Worksheet ws = (Excel.Worksheet)wb.Worksheets.get_Item(1); 
Excel.Range rng = ws.Cells.get_Resize(Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr.GetLength(0), 
Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr.GetLength(1)); 
            rng.Value2 = Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr; 
                for (int i = 99; i >= 80; i--) 
                { 
                    //wb = xlApp.Workbooks.Add(Excel.XlWBATemplate.xlWBATWorksheet); 
                    ws = (Excel.Worksheet)wb.Worksheets.Add(); 
xlApp.Cells[1, 1] = "Senario #" + Convert.ToString(Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[i, 0]); 
                    xlApp.Cells[2, 1] = "Year"; 
                    xlApp.Cells[2, 2] = "Road Action"; 
                    xlApp.Cells[2, 3] = "Road Condition"; 
                    xlApp.Cells[2, 4] = "Road LOS"; 
                    xlApp.Cells[2, 5] = "Road Vul"; 
                    xlApp.Cells[2, 6] = "Road Action Cost"; 
                    xlApp.Cells[2, 7] = "Road Score"; 
                    xlApp.Cells[2, 8] = "Water Action"; 
                    xlApp.Cells[2, 9] = "Water Condition"; 
                    xlApp.Cells[2, 10] = "Water LOS"; 
                    xlApp.Cells[2, 11] = "Water Vul"; 
                    xlApp.Cells[2, 12] = "Water Action Cost"; 
                    xlApp.Cells[2, 13] = "Water Score"; 
                    xlApp.Cells[2, 14] = "Total Cost"; 
                    xlApp.Cells[2, 15] = "Total Score"; 
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                    xlApp.Cells[3, 1] = 0; 
                    xlApp.Cells[3, 2] = "intial"; 
                    xlApp.Cells[3, 3] = intial_condition[0]; 
                    xlApp.Cells[3, 4] = intial_condition[1]; 
                    xlApp.Cells[3, 5] = intial_condition[2]; 
                    xlApp.Cells[3, 6] = 0; 
                    xlApp.Cells[3, 7] = intial_condition[3]; 
                    xlApp.Cells[3, 8] = "intial"; 
                    xlApp.Cells[3, 9] = intial_condition[4]; 
                    xlApp.Cells[3, 10] = intial_condition[5]; 
                    xlApp.Cells[3, 11] = intial_condition[6]; 
                    xlApp.Cells[3, 12] = 0; 
                    xlApp.Cells[3, 13] = intial_condition[7]; 
                    xlApp.Cells[3, 14] = 0; 
                    xlApp.Cells[3, 15] = intial_condition[8]; 
                    int senario_index = Convert.ToInt32(Global_Var.Senario_ranking_arr[i, 0]); 
                    for (int n = 1; n <= Global_Var.intervention_period; n++) 
                    { 
                        xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 1] = n; 
 if 
(Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_ind
ex, n], 1], 0) == 1) 
                        { 
                            xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 2] = "Do Nothing"; 
                        } 
if 
(Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_ind
ex, n], 1], 0) == 2) 
                        { 
                            xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 2] = "Minor"; 





ex, n], 1],0) == 3) 
                        { 
                            xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 2] = "Major"; 
                        } 
if 
(Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_ind
ex, n], 1], 0) == 4) 
                        { 
                            xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 2] = "Replace"; 
                        } 
xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 3] = 
Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_inde
x, n], 8], 0); 
xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 4] = 
Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_inde
x, n], 8], 0); 
                        for (int y = 0; y <= 8; y++) 
                        { 
                            asset_data[y] = Global_Var.bundles_data[x, y]; 
                        } 
 asset_data[8] = 
Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_inde
x, n], 8], 0); 
asset_data[9] = 
Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_inde
x, n], 18], 0); 
// Genetic algorithm 
                        // set level of service 
                        double los1 = asset_data[8]; 
                        // calculate road vulnerablity 
                        double vul1 = calculate_Vulnerablity(asset_data); 
                        // calculate score 
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                        double road_score = calculate_road_score(asset_data[8], los1, vul1); 
                        xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 5] = vul1; 
 xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 6] = 
Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_index, n], 19]; 
                        xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 7] = road_score; 
 if 
(Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_ind
ex, n], 12], 0) == 1) 
                        { 
                            xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 8] = "Do Nothing"; 
                        } 
if 
(Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_ind
ex, n], 12], 0) == 2) 
                        { 
                            xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 8] = "Minor"; 
                        } 
if 
(Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_ind
ex, n], 12], 0) == 3) 
                        { 
                            xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 8] = "Major"; 
                        } 
if 
(Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_ind
ex, n], 12], 0) == 4) 
                        { 
                            xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 8] = "Replace"; 
                        } 
 xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 9] = 
Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_inde
x, n], 18], 0); 
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xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 10] = 
Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_inde
x, n], 18], 0); 
                        for (int y = 0; y <= 8; y++) 
                        { 
                            asset_data[y] = Global_Var.bundles_data[x, y + 9]; 
                        } 
asset_data[8] = 
Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_inde
x, n], 18], 0); 
asset_data[9] = 
Math.Round(Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_inde
x, n], 8], 0); 
                        // set level of service 
                        double los2 = asset_data[8]; 
                        // calculate water vulnerablity 
                        double vul2 = calculate_Vulnerablity(asset_data); 
                        // calculate score 
                        double water_score = calculate_road_score(asset_data[8], los2, vul2); 
                        // calculate total score 
                        double total_score = road_score + water_score; 
                        xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 11] = vul2; 
 xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 12] = 
Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_index, n], 21]; 
xlApp.Cells[n + 3, 13] = water_score;  
xlApp.Cells[n+3,14]=Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[sena
rio_index, n], 19]+ Global_Var.action_logger[Global_Var.Senario_logger[senario_index, 
n], 21]; 
